Elder A. Hollems, of Iowa, has sent us the following:

      "What is the theological difference between man's intellectual and moral natures (1 Cor. xiii. 2)?

      The theological difference, it seems to us, is not exactly what the brother wants. However, as pertaining to theology, the difference is very great, being nothing less than the difference between nothing and everything. Theologically, we have but little, if anything, to do with intellect, or with the intellectual faculties, while we have everything to do with the moral faculties. True, the intellectual powers are necessarily recognized; they are to be used and improved, but that is all. And that does not belong properly to theology. What, therefore, the brother really wants to know, we presume, is simply the difference between man intellectually and morally, or between the intellectual and the moral character of man.

      By the term nature different things may be understood. Whatever is made or proposed is nature, as the word comes from natus, born, produced; which is from nascor, to be born, come into the world, and seems to correspond to the Greek gennao, or genesis. Phasis is also translated nature, and means production, birth, etc.

      From this sense of the term is derived the more common meaning, viz.: the essential qualities or attributes of a thing; the innate properties, faculties, talents, powers, etc.; the natural, or natal, constitution.

      Strictly speaking man has no moral nature or constitution. Man is a totality, composed of matter and spirit. In constitution he is physical, psychical and pneumatical; i. e., he has body, soul and spirit. Now, to man in his totality as thus constituted are given certain powers, or capacities, or faculties. These are usually divided and classified under three grand divisions, viz.: the Intellect, the Susceptibility, and the Will. This division, we believe, is now almost universally accepted. Our authorities (Hickok, Haven, Wayland, Delitzsch, Rauch, Finney, and Lange), with a number of authors quoted by them, thus classify the human powers. It must, however, not be forgotten that the mind is not complex, but one and indivisible. But its activity is exercised in various ways, and upon widely different classes of objects; and as these modes of action vary we assign them different names, and treat of them in distinction from each other (Haven).

      The intellect includes every capacity or power for knowing, including the idea and cognizance of the right. Its functions are three-fold, viz.: the sense, the understanding, and the reason. None of these have any moral quality in themselves.

      The will is the capacity or power of the mind the originate acts (Hickok). It is that power the exercises of which possess a moral character. And nothing else in man, in itself, possesses any moral character. Besides, this is all the moral nature or constitution that man, or any being, has. He has a faculty or power that can be exercised according to moral law. This, with the power to discern right and wrong, makes him a moral agent; this gives him a moral character. So that strictly speaking, the constitution or nature of man is not partly intellectual and partly moral; but he has intellectual powers, and he has the faculty to know right and wrong, and powers that may be exercised in accordance with, or in opposition to moral law. These latter powers are included under the will, which must be capable of unhindered activity as against constraint and opposition of every character. And this is what is erroneously called man's moral nature or constitution.

[The Church Advocate 40 (August 4, 1875): 4.]

      Christian H. Forney's "Man's Intellectual and Moral Natures" was first published in The Church Advocate, Vol. 40, No. 14 (August 4, 1875), p. 4. The electronic version has been transcribed from a copy of the article printed from a microfilmed edition of the newspaper held by the State Library of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Adams Memorial Library for arranging for the interlibrary loan, and to St. Vincent College Library for the use of its microfilm reader/printer.

      In the printed text, an extended quotation is set off by the absence of leading between lines; in the printed text, it is set off as a block quotation. Inconsistencies in spelling, capitalization, punctuation, and typography have been retained.

      Addenda and corrigenda are earnestly solicited.

Ernie Stefanik
Derry, PA

Created 30 June 1999.
Updated 13 July 2003.