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On the Semantic Relevance of Romanovs

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to work toward a refined conception of the distinction between what is semantically expressed and what is pragmatically implicated, for the case of proper names. The background context is a recent exchange between Fara (2011, forthcoming) and Jeshion (forthcoming a, forthcoming b). First, I will sketch some of the varieties of cases at issue in the Fara-Jeshion exchange. Next, I will briefly set up a neo-Gricean conception of the semantics/pragmatics interface. Finally, I explore what that framework has to say about some of these contested cases.

Keywords: semantics, pragmatics, proper names, neo-Gricean, cancelability, implicature

0. Introduction

The primary aim of this paper is to work toward a refined conception of the distinction between what is semantically expressed and what is pragmatically implicated, for the case of proper names. The background context is a recent exchange between Fara (2011, forthcoming) and Jeshion (forthcoming a, forthcoming b). Fara argues in favor of a predicativist theory of proper names (according to which a use of a proper name, in context, semantically expresses a property),[1] and Jeshion responds to Fara's arguments on behalf of the more orthodox referentialist

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[1] Burge (1973) is a recent classic in the predicativist tradition; Fara also notes some precedent in the writings of Russell and Quine. The meaning of a proper name 'N' for predicativists is cashed out along the lines of "being called N" or "being the bearer of 'N'". For present purposes, I will not get into the specific details of how Fara's version of predicativism differs from some of the other varieties.

approach to proper names (according to which a use of a proper name, in context, refers to a specific individual that is its referent).

One of the central dialectical strands at issue – in the predicativist-referentialist debates in general, and in the Fara-Jeshion exchange in particular – is the *uniformity argument* for predicativism. All parties concede that some uses of proper names clearly exhibit the syntactic and semantic hallmarks of singular terms (e.g., 'Alfred loves to snowboard'), while other uses seem to exhibit the syntactic and semantic hallmarks of predicates (e.g., 'There are three Alfreds who work in this building'). Crudely put, the uniformity argument is that since only the predicativist can give one uniform treatment of both sorts of uses, while the referentialist has to give two different accounts for these two different sorts of case, this counts as a *prima facie* reason in favor of predicativism. Jeshion (forthcoming a) questions whether the predicativists really do have uniformity on their side in this debate, by offering a wide variety of examples which do not seem to be amenable to a uniform predicativist analysis. Fara (forthcoming) and Jeshion (forthcoming b) further discuss the proper analyses of this challenging range of cases.

Now, to be sure, there are some tricky issues to be navigated in engaging with this Fara-Jeshion exchange. For example, predicativists and referentialists do not even agree about how the use/mention distinction applies to proper names (cf. Fara 2011), let alone as to what should be characterized as a typical or literal use of a proper name vs. what should be understood as a non-standard or non-literal use. Still, though, the distinction between what a use of a name semantically expresses vs. pragmatically implicates is absolutely central to this exchange. Hence, this is an appropriate, interesting, and pressing segue into a look at how uses of proper names relate to the S/P interface.

First, I will sketch some of the varieties of cases at issue in the Fara-Jeshion exchange. Next, I will briefly set up a neo-Gricean conception of the S/P interface. Finally, I explore what that framework has to say about some of these contested cases, and draw out some morals.

1. Some Contested Cases

First, all parties agree to set aside the *Machiavelli examples*, such as:

(1) Dick is a real Machiavelli.
(2) My mother thinks that she is some kind of Martha Stewart.

These pose a *prima facie* problem for predicativists becaue they are instances of proper names which are not amenable to treatment along the lines of any sort of "being called" condition. There are some minor disagreements between Fara and Jeshion about their correct theoretical taxonomy. However, since ultimately both agree that these are non-literal uses of names – and so not critically pertinent to the uniformity argument – I will not get into these details here. *Machiavellis* are principally interesting as a theoretical point of contrast – i.e., given that *Machiavellis* are irrelevant to the literal meaning of proper names, sometimes, for some of the more contentious sorts of case below, the question is whether they are relevantly similar to *Machiavellis* (and hence non-literal, and so also irrelevant to the semantics of proper names).

Following Burge (1973), *Machiavellis* are often characterized as 'metaphorical' uses of names. It is fairly evident why, as such uses serve to draw attention to similarities between subjects in an artful and open-textured way. Again, it is a crucial open, difficult question which other sorts of uses of proper names, in addition to these, should be understood as non-literal. Unfortunately, Fara (forthcoming: end of section 4) is cagey and vague on this question.[2] (Perhaps she thinks it is folly to try to impose any such binary categorization as literal/non-literal onto a vastly complex range of cases?) In any case, I aim to try to impose some more order, on this front.

Next come the *Romanov examples*, first introduced in Boer's (1975) criticisms of Burge's (1973) version of predicativism:

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[2] Fara says: "…[R]ather than engage in debate … about whether the claims made in each sort of example are literal or not … I will say that they are "literal" with 'literal' in scare quotes." While this move may be dialogically appropriate in its home context, unfortunately, when it comes to my primary interest in this paper, it completely sidesteps what is crucially at issue.

(3)   Joe Romanov is not a Romanov. (i.e., he is not related to the fa-
mous dynasty)

(4)   Waldo Cox is a Romanov. (i.e., he is related to the famous dyn-
asty)

Again, we seem to have here instances of proper names which are not
amenable to treatment along the lines of any sort of "being called" con-
dition. These are critically pertinent to the uniformity argument. Rough-
ly following one of Boer's (1975) arguments against Burge (1973), Jesh-
ion (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) presses the case that *Romanov exam-
ples* provide counterexamples to Fara's version of predicativism – and
so, from there, that they go toward undermining the force of the uni-
formity argument for predicativism. Fara's (forthcoming) response is
that these are literal uses, but should not be understood as occurrences of
proper names. The sentence-ending occurrences of 'Romanov' in (3) and
(4) are in her view instances of proper nouns which are not proper names
(such as, for example 'kleenex' or 'hoover').

Thirdly and fourthly, there are *deferred interpretation examples*:

(5)   This museum has four Magrittes.

(6)   Two John Lennons came to the Halloween party.

And *resemblance examples*:

(7)   Two little Lenas just arrived. (i.e., said of two daughters of Jesh-
ion's friend Lena, who closely resemble their mother)

As in the cases of (1)-(4) above, here again we seem to have instances of
proper names which are not amenable to treatment along the lines of any
sort of "being called" condition. I cordon these off together again fol-
lowing Fara, who treats them as amenable to pragmatic explanations. So,
whereas Jeshion takes (5)-(7), like (3)-(4), to be counterexamples to
Fara's version of predicativism, and so to go toward undermining the
uniformity argument, Fara responds that they rather instance a certain
kind of *usage* which is exactly paralleled by other sorts of expression in
addition to proper names. (See Fara forthcoming: section 5 for discus-

sion of non-proper-name deferred interpretation cases, and Fara forth-coming: section 6 for non-proper-name resemblance cases.) Hence, ac-cording to Fara, neither of these sorts of case supports any such claims about the semantics of proper names.[3]

By this point, it may be evident why I hold out some hope that a fur-ther investigation into the S/P interface, as it pertains to the case of uses of proper names, might have some promise to push this debate forward. In any case, I will try it out.

2. A Neo-Gricean Conception of the S/P Interface

A neo-Gricean conception of the S/P interface, as I will use the term, is any of the variety of views which accord a central theoretical place to (some version of) Grice's factorization of WHAT IS COMMU-NICATED with a use of a sentence in context into WHAT IS SEMAN-TICALLY EXPRESSED and WHAT IS PRAGMATICALLY IMPLI-CATED.[4] Neo-Griceans hold that semantics and pragmatics are distinct and discrete (though intimately interrelated) channels involved in lin-guistic communication. To cite one paradigmatic example, Grice's (1975) famous letter of reference semantically expresses that Mr. X has an excellent command of English and a good attendance record, while pragmatically implicating that Mr. X is no good at philosophy.

Neo-Griceans, thus understood, may depart from the letter of Grice's views on many specific points; and the varieties of neo-Gricean views are rather heterogeneous, in several respects.[5] Examples of points of contention within the neo-Gricean ranks include whether conventional implicatures should be counted as truth-conditionally irrelevant, and whether irony, sarcasm, or metaphor can or should be explained prag-matically (cf. note 6). Nonetheless, the term 'neo-Gricean' is not so

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[3] I call this move of Fara's the 'speech act test'. See the end of section 2 for dis-cussion and section 3 for illustration.

[4] These capitalized expressions are not exactly Grice's term, though of course they are inspired by and closely related to his.

[5] Some influential neo-Gricean works include Kripke (1977), Levinson (2000), and Horn (2004).

broad as to include all parties to the debates at the S/P interface. In particular, the centrality of Grice's factorization has been challenged by relevance theorists, contextualists, and semantic relativists. (For recent development of this claim, though not exactly in these terms, see Borg 2012: Chapter 1). One core non-neo-Gricean objection is that the entire factorization itself is a drastic oversimplification and an untenable relic from a bygone era. (As Borg puts it, many theorists hold that "pragmatic effects are endemic throughout the literal, truth-evaluable content expressed by sentences".)

Notwithstanding all that, for several reasons, this work will be crafted within the neo-Gricean framework. Now, a key question for a neo-Gricean is: How, exactly, do you tell whether something which is communicated with a use of a sentence (in context) should be counted as semantically expressed or as pragmatically communicated? There are of course lots of stock banalities in the neighborhood – e.g., semantics studies linguistic meaning whereas pragmatics studies language use; semantic properties are encoded in the linguistic expression whereas pragmatic properties are generated by the act of using *that expression* in *that context*; semantic properties are common amongst all tokens of the expression type, whereas pragmatic properties are distinctive to only some tokens of the type. However, the ongoing debates about the proper theoretical classification of certain phenomena proves that these banalities do not amount to firm criteria.[6]

Tentatively, for present working purposes, I will take three core related indicators that a certain phenomenon is appropriately treated as pragmatic, as opposed to semantic – out of the various candidates that have been proposed (cf., e.g., Levinson 2000) – to be Grice's (1975) notions of 'cancelability' and 'calculability' and Recanati's (2004) notion of a 'post-propositional' interpretative process. I will briefly illustrate these three related indicators with reference to the aforementioned ca-

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[6] A further illustrative example: Bach (2004, 2007) and Devitt (2004, 2007) are both card-carrying neo-Griceans who assent to all of these banalities about the S/P divide, and yet they vehemently disagree as to whether referential uses of descriptions can or should be explained pragmatically.

nonical example of Grice's (1975) reference letter for a philosophy job candidate:

> Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc. (Grice1975: 33)

In context, this letter conversationally implicates that, as Grice puts it:

(CI)   Mr. X is no good at philosophy.

Now, this implicature is both cancelable and calculable. As for cancelability, suppose that the letter had continued, after "…has been regular", to say:

(*)   Mr. X is also the most brilliant philosophical mind of his generation.

Although the result would be an odd reference letter, on the whole it would not implicate (CI). Contrast that with a letter which explicitly says 'Mr. X is no good at philosophy'. In this case it would be semantically jarring, and not just odd, to continue with (*). So, in general, pragmatic implications be cancelled without contradiction, either explicitly or contextually; whereas, to cancel semantic content essentially involves contradiction.

As for calculability, the idea here is that pragmatic implicatures can be represented as the conclusion of a certain chain of reasoning, sometimes called a 'Gricean derivation'.[7] In general, necessary conditions for pragmatically implicating that Q by semantically expressing that P include that: (i) the speaker is to be presumed to be observing Grice's Cooperative Principle; (ii) the supposition that the speaker is aware of, or thinks that, Q is required in order to satisfy (i); and (iii) the speaker thinks that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out the content of Q (Grice 1975: 30-31). The core point here is that semantic com-

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[7]   As Bach (among others) has pointed out, it is important to bear in mind that "Grice did not intend his account of how implicatures are recognized as a psychological theory or even as a cognitive model. He intended it as a rational reconstruction" (Bach 2006: 28). Some objections to the neo-Gricean picture may well be attacks on a straw target, for want of attention to this distinction.

petence is necessary, but not remotely close to sufficient, for working out pragmatic implicatures. Extra-semantic calculation, in some form or other, is also required.

Finally then to the related notion of a post-propositional interpretative process (Recanati 2004: 23ff). Pre-propositional processes are things the interpreter has to figure out *prior to* identifying the proposition expressed, while post-propositional processes "presuppose the prior identification of some proposition serving as input" (Recanati 2004: 23). For example, it is standard to take the disambiguation of ambiguous word-forms (e.g., 'bank', 'trunk') and the saturation of indexicals (e.g., 'she', 'here') to be pre-propositional processes. In contrast, conversational implicatures are post-propositional. [8] They are pursuant to what is semantically expressed, as some grasp – however tacit – of the content of the proposition semantically expressed is crucial to identifying the content being pragmatically implicated.

Of course non-neo-Griceans have done much to cloud this pre- vs. post-propositional distinction. For example, interpretive processes such as free enrichment do not fall squarely on either side of the divide. (E.g., when we hear 'She took out her key and opened the door', we take it to assert that she opened the door *with* the key.) Nonetheless, the distinction is still a useful one for present purposes. I merely take 'post-propositional' to be a reliable indicator that the phenomenon in question is suited for a pragmatic explanation, and do not claim or pre-suppose that the 'pre-/post-propositional' distinction is exhaustive.

As mentioned above (cf. note 3), there is a relevant, rough and ready, opertational test to which Fara (implicitly) appeals, which has some precedent in debates at the S/P interface. I will call it the 'speech act test'. The idea runs as follows: suppose a hypothesis is floated about distinc-

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[8] This was certainly Grice's view, but it has been recently contested (cf., e.g., Sedivy 2007). I will follow Grice and count conversational implicatures as post-propositional. For one thing, this is still the orthodox view among philosophers. Further, given the extent to which these recent challenges are built on experimental data pertaining to language processing, the worry described in note 7 may well apply. (Calling them post-propositional is not a claim about exactly when or how they are actually psychologically processed; and so is not subject to refutation by such data.)

tive semantic properties of a certain kind of expression E1. To the extent that it can be shown that the phenomenon in question is not distinctive to E1, but rather has a parallel echo for other kinds of expression E2 and E3 and …, this suggests that a pragmatic explanation might be more appropriate. It suggests that this is rather an instance of a sort of speech act, as opposed to a semantic fact about E1.

Probably the most recognizable application of this speech act test is a style of argument known as 'Grice's razor' – though note that Grice's razor is a specific instance of the speech act test which only applies to hypotheses pertaining to ambiguity. Thus, for example, Grice argues contra Strawson (1952) that 'and' is not ambiguous because the phenomena motivating Strawson's distinct senses has a parallel echo for cases which have nothing to do with 'and'; Bach (2004), again, argues contra Devitt (2004) that 'the' is not ambiguous because the motivating phenomena pointed to by Devitt has a parallel echo for cases which have nothing to do with 'the'; and so on. So, Grice's razor is an application of the speech act test to argue against the positing of multiple senses for a certain expression, on the grounds that the general theory of speech acts offers a compelling and semantically parsimonious explanation of the data in question.

One of Fara's lines of response to Jeshion is similar, though it has nothing to do with ambiguity, and so is not an instance of Grice's razor. One of the things that Fara says in response to the deferred interpretation and resemblance examples is, in effect, 'I can supply non-proper-name examples which instance this same phenomenon; ergo this phenomenon is irrelevant to the semantics of proper names'. That is an instance of what I am calling the 'speech act test' for dividing pragmatic implication from semantic content, and it too will play a role in the next section.

3. Applying the Neo-Gricean Framework to the Contested Cases

Now then to consider some Jeshion-Fara contested cases within this neo-Gricean framework.

Let us consider *Machiavellis* first, to help fix ideas. Predicativists and referentialists will agree that the literal truth-conditional content ex-

pressed by (1) is false (even though they will characterize the literal truth-conditional content differently):

    (1) Dick is a real Machiavelli.

What about the content communicated in addition to, or as distinct from, this literal truth-conditional content (which may be true)? Is it cancelable? Calculable? Post-propositional?

    Here I clearly get CANC (-), CALC (+), and PP (+). The latter two first: Working out this extra-literal content communicated requires extra-semantic calculation (so CALC (+)), and that content is very much dependent upon the (false) literal, truth-conditional content, in this case as in the case of pragmatic implicatures generally (so PP (+)).

    As for cancelability, while any specific association may be cancelled without contradiction, that goes to the open-texturedness of this sort of speech act. So, I could say these sorts of things without contradiction:

    (1) a. Dick is a real Machiavelli; though he is not really the most cunning of rulers.
         b. Dick is a real Machiavelli; though he is not at all deceitful.

However, I could not say this one:

    (1*) Dick is a real Machiavelli; though he is not at all deceitful, nor cunning, nor ruthless, nor opportunistic, nor … etc. etc.

That is to say, the extra-literal content communicated with a *Machiavelli* example is not cancellable.[9]

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[9] Of course, the point was already made by Camp (2006) that the fact that sarcasm does not seem to be cancelable does not yet show that sarcasm is semantic, but rather shows that we have to be careful not to put too much stock in cancelability as an indicator of semantic vs. pragmatic content. We are dealing with more-or-less reliable indicators here, as opposed to exceptionless necessary or sufficient conditions.

Further, the *Machiavelli* phenomenon is in relevant respects closely paralleled by other sorts of non-proper-name expressions. Thus, compare (1) with:

(8) Dick is a real planet.
(9) Dick is a real ocean.

More or less everything said about the CANC (-), CALC (+), and PP (+) nature of *Machiavellis* applies here as well. This is exactly what we should expect – i.e., the speech act test bolsters the consensus view that Machievellis are semantically irrelevant.

Let us turn next to resemblance examples; for Fara (forthcoming: section 6) is tempted toward the view that these are just a variant on the *Machiavelli* (or metaphorical) cases, and this suggestion seems to be quite right to me. Resemblance examples, too, are ways of drawing attention to similarities between subjects in an artful and open-textured way. As such, more or less everything said above about the CANC (-), CALC (+), and PP (+) nature of *Machiavellis* applies to (7):

(7) Two little Lenas arrived.

And, again, see Fara (forthcoming: section 6) for discussion of various non-proper-name sorts of resemblance examples, which again serve to bolster the intuition that this phenomenon is amenable to pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, explanation. So, resemblance examples too are not terribly relevant to the literal semantics of proper names. They are rather instances of a certain general non-literal, metaphorical sort of speech act.

This applies also to the deferred interpretation cases, for here again I clearly get CANC (-), CALC (+), PP (+) – in addition to Fara's (forthcoming: section 5) already mentioned discussion of a parallel echo for non-proper-name cases. The putative[10] extra-semantic content expressed is calculable in that something more than semantic competence is re-

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[10] To avoid the need for a tangent into the proper treatment of deferred interpretations at the S/P interface, I will just tack on this vague but innocuous qualification.

quired here – i.e., someone who did not get what was meant by 'This museum has four Magrittes' lacks knowledge about the pragmatics of a certain language game, not necessarily about the semantics of any of the expressions tokened. And it is post-propositional in that the literal semantic content is essential to working out that deferred message. (Again, this claim is conceptual or logical, not psychological – cf. notes 7 and 8.)

However, here again we have a failure of cancelability. That is, one could not say either of these without contradiction:

(10*) The ham sandwich is sitting at table seven; though I am not saying that there is a person who ordered a ham sandwich sitting at that table.

(11*) This museum has four Magrittes; though I am not saying that there are four paintings by Magritte in the museum.

(10*) and (11*) clearly strike me as taking something back, contradictory; and hence this putative extra-semantic content expressed by these cases is not cancelable, in the relevant sense.

Hence, deferred interpretation examples too involve their own distinctive complex of questions at the S/P interface, and do not seem to show up anything pertinent about the semantics of proper names. When it comes to a crucial dialectical question identified early in section 1 above – i.e., which other sorts of uses of proper names, in addition to *Machiavellis*, should be understood as non-literal? – the neo-Gricean framework seems to be returning a qualified verdict of *irrelevant to the literal semantics of proper names* for many, if not all, of Jeshion's challenging cases. ('Qualified' in that while the CALC, PP, and speech act tests seem to be pointing toward a pragmatic explanation of Jeshion's data, the CANC test is pointing in the opposite direction.)

Finally, then, to *Romanovs*:

(3) Joe Romanov is not a Romanov.
(4) Waldo Cox is a Romanov.

Here, again, we get the same CANC (-), CALC (+), PP (+) pattern. As in the above cases, the putative extra-literal content communicated with (3) clearly depends on the literal content semantically associated with the sentence. (Again, someone who did not get the putative extra-literal content communicated by (3) lacks knowledge of European history, not of the semantics of English.) Here again there clearly seem to be non-proper-name *Romanov* examples,[11] and so the speech act test too suggests that *Romanovs* have little to teach us about the semantics of proper names.

Again, though, I also get CANC (-) here. That is, it feels contradictory to follow (3) with something along the lines of: "Well, he is one of *the* (famous) Romanovs".

In any case, without even getting into an adjudication of Fara's (forthcoming: section 8) claim about *Romanovs* instancing proper nouns which are not proper names, there are considerably strong neo-Gricean grounds for accounting for this phenomenon pragmatically. *Romanovs*, too, seem to be irrelevant to the semantics of proper names.[12]

4. Conclusions

All of this points to both vindication for and criticism of both Fara and Jeshion.

First to vindicating Fara and criticizing Jeshion: on the whole, Jeshion's data seem to be irrelevant to the literal semantics of proper names. There is considerable reason to think that Jeshion's challenging cases are, for the most part, instances of pragmatic phenomena which support no pertinent semantic conclusions. Hence, by and large, they are irrelevant to the predicativist-referentialist debate. So, insofar as one of the aims of Fara (forthcoming) is to establish that Jeshion has not refuted (her version of) predicativism (cf. the last two paragraphs of her section 1), Fara might take comfort in these findings.

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[11] For example: "Obama is no *politician*; though his youngest daughter really is"; "Here we see a respect in which Kant fails to be a *philosopher*".

[12] Cf. Jeshion's (forthcoming b) conjecture that *Romanovs* are frozen or dead deferred interpretations.

Next then to vindicating Jeshion and criticizing Fara: what Jeshion
(forthcoming a) was seeking to do is to undermine the predicativists' en-
titlement to the uniformity argument, not to refute (any particular ver-
sion of) predicativism *per se*. Hence, regardless of the tenability of any-
thing in particular which Fara says about any or all of the particular vari-
eties of challenging case, Fara (forthcoming) fails to engage with an im-
portant methodological question pressed by Jeshion. The question is to
justify exclusive focus on putative singular term (e.g., 'Alfred loves to
snowboard') and putative predicate (e.g., 'There are three Alfreds who
work in this building') uses of proper names, when there is such a vast
range of myriad other sorts of uses.[13] Why privilege uniformity over two
sorts of case, when there are many other sorts of case which are not
amenable to that analysis?

Again, what I have done here might be quite amenable to Fara, and
amount to some work toward one possible way of answering that chal-
lenge. But the present point is that Fara does not herself meet that chal-
lenge, and so begs this question against Jeshion.

A closing note on the big picture: I myself (Sullivan 2012: section 5.5)
favor a metalinguistic account of the core cases which motivate predica-
tivism, but I certainly do not think that my opinion on that question will
be found compelling or persuasive to predicativists. (My neurons invari-
ably add quotation marks and elided material to such constructions as
"There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton".) But what of Jeshion's
points about "the common form in all the (apparently) predicative uses
of proper names", and the (undeveloped but plausible) suggestion that
the distinction between generic names and specific names might be able
to underwrite an account of this broad range of cases? I think that these
latter points would be harder for a predicativist to dismiss as referential-
ist' polemic. (Indeed, there certainly seem to be close parallels between
Fara's aforementioned distinction between proper names and proper

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[13] "[These cases] are not recherché, certainly no more than [the predicative uses of
names]. I would venture a guess that many of the varieties of examples of uses of
proper names just sketched are empirically more common than [the predicative
uses]. … [These cases] are bona fide uses of proper names that any semantic the-
ory must confront and … may not sweep aside as special cases, at least without
special justification for doing so." (Jeshion, forthcoming a: section 6)

nouns and the referentialists' distinction between specific and generic names. There are also parallels here to Kaplan's (1990) views.) Given the potential virtues of that line of explanation, when it comes to simplicity, uniformity, and neo-Gricean parsimony, it seems that the next important step in this dialectic is to dig in and see whether this line of thought can be satisfactorily, comprehensively developed.

I end with two other questions for future research:

(1) Would the view described in that paragraph be a predicativist-referentialist synthesis? To what extent would predicativists' find vindication in the circumstance that generic names are more common and significant than had been generally conceded?

(2) What of this consistent failure of cancelability found throughout the above cases? Is this a persistent indication that there is something semantic about these cases after all, or a further unfolding of reasons not to put too much stock in cancelability, as an indicator at the S/P interface?

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