What we must take into consideration is first the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole, and second the relationship of the science of religion to the needs of our time.

The object is religion. This is the loftiest object that can occupy human beings; it is the absolute object. It is the region of eternal truth and eternal virtue, the region where all the riddles of thought, all contradictions, and all the sorrows of the heart should show themselves to be resolved, and the region of the eternal peace through which the human being is truly human. All the endless

1. [Ed.] None of the extant manuscripts has an initial heading. One might suppose, on the basis of the summary statement in the opening sentence, that the first topic to be considered, beginning immediately in the next paragraph, is “the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole.” But this summary is misleading since the first topic Hegel considers—and only after what we are calling the “Preface”—is rather different (see n. 5). The summary of the first of the two points to be considered actually reflects the 1824 lectures, which indicates that Hegel used the Griesheim transcript of 1824 when he lectured in 1827, changing the content of the latter lectures as he proceeded. The first long paragraph (“The object is religion . . . our intent to consider”) is based on the opening remarks in the Ms., which Hegel repeated in 1824 and 1827. In order to identify this common material we are using the heading “Preface,” although it is not an expression used by Hegel himself. The 1827 “Preface” cannot be reconstructed from either W or L since both of them tightly interweave materials from 1821, 1824, and 1827 in an editorial version of Hegel’s opening remarks. Our text at this point is based on the transcript of the Polish student Hube, whose German left something to be desired. His staccato sentences, rapid shifts of images, and grammatical infelicities have been smoothed out a bit, but the style is not characteristic of Hegel and the contents are abbreviated.
intricacies of human activity and pleasures arise from the determination of human being as implicitly spirit. Everything that people value and esteem, everything on which they think to base their pride and glory, all of this finds its ultimate focal point in religion, in the thought or consciousness of God and in the feeling of God. God is the beginning and end of all things. God is the sacred center, which animates and inspires all things. Religion possesses its object within itself—and that object is God, for religion is the relation of human consciousness to God. The object of religion is simply through itself and on its own account; it is the absolutely final end in and for itself, the absolutely free being. Here our concern about the final end can have no other final end than this object itself. Only in this context do all other aims experience their settlement. In its concern with this object, spirit frees itself from all finitude. "This concern is the true liberation of the human being and is freedom itself, true consciousness of the truth." Everything [else] drops into the past. Finite life seems like a desert. Religion is the consciousness of freedom and truth. If our concern with it is a feeling then it is bliss, and if an activity then it has to manifest God's glory and majesty. This concept of religion is universal. Religion holds this position for all peoples and persons. Everywhere this concern is regarded as the sabbath of life. Truly in this region of the spirit flow the waters of forgetfulness from which the soul drinks. All the griefs of this bank and shoal of life vanish away in this aether, whether in the feeling of devotion or of hope. All of it drops into the past. In religion all cares pass away, for in it one finds oneself fortunate. All harshness of fate passes into a dream. Everything earthly dissolves into light and love, not a remote but an actually present liveliness, certainty, and enjoyment. Even if [the bliss of] religion

2. *Thus Hu with An; W₁ reads:* In its concern with this object, spirit unburdens itself of all finitude. This concern leads to satisfaction and liberation. *W₁ (Var/1831?) reads:* In the region in which spirit concerns itself with this aim it unburdens itself of all finitude and gains ultimate satisfaction and liberation; for here spirit no longer relates itself to something other and limited, but to the unlimited and the infinite instead. This is an infinite relationship, a relationship of freedom and no longer one of dependence.

3. [Ed.] The mythical underworld river *Lēthē*, the personification of oblivion.

is put off into the future, it is still radiant in life here and now, or in the actuality within which this image is effective and substantial. Such is the universal content of religion among human beings; this content it is our intent to consider.

1. Comparison of Philosophy and Religion with Regard to Their Object

But it should be noted straightaway that the proposal to “consider” it involves a relationship to it that is already twisted out of shape. For when we speak of “consideration” and “object” we are distinguishing the two as freestanding, mutually independent, and independent of one another and remain separate. In assuming this observational relationship, we would be stepping outside of the region of devotion and enjoyment that religion is; the object and the [act of] consideration as the movement of thought would then be as distinct as (for example) the spatial figures in mathematics are distinct from the spirit that considers them. But this is only the relationship as it appears to begin with, when cognition is still severed from the religious side and is finite cognition. If we look more closely, however, it is evident that in fact the content, need, and interest of philosophy is something it has in common with religion.

The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its very objectivity, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom but cognition of the nonworldly; not cognition of external mass or of empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, of what God is and what flows from God's nature: for this nature must reveal and develop itself. Hence philosophy is only explicating itself when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. Since it is the concern with eternal truth, which is in and for itself, and indeed since it is the occupation of thinking spirit (not of individual caprice and of particular interest) with this object, philosophy is the same activity as religion. In its philosophizing, spirit immerses itself just as vitally in this object, and relinquishes its particularity in the same way. For it
fixed sides that are mutually opposed. For example, space is the object of geometry, but the spatial figures that it considers are distinct from the considering spirit, for they are only its “object.” So if we say now that philosophy ought to consider religion, then these two are likewise set in a relationship of distinction in which they stand in opposition to one another. But on the contrary it must be said that the content of philosophy, its need and interest, is wholly in common with that of religion. The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating itself when

penetrates its object just as the religious consciousness does, which also has nothing of its own but only wants to immerse itself in this content.

Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God; it is religion, because it involves the same renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions in its concern with God. Thus philosophy is identical with religion, and the distinction [between them] is that philosophy exists in a way peculiar to itself, distinguished from the mode we are accustomed to call “religion” as such. What they have in common is that they are both religion; what distinguishes them consists only in the type and mode of religion [that each is]. They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. But this is where the difficulties lie, which seem so great that for philosophy ever to be one with religion counts as an impossibility. The apprehensive attitude of theology toward philosophy and the [mutually] hostile stance of religion and philosophy arise from this. In the perspective of this hostile stance (as theology construes it), it seems that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it, and that the concern of philosophy with God is completely different from that of religion. This is the old antipathy and contradiction that we already see among the Greeks; for even among the Athenians, that free and democratic people, books were burned and Socrates was condemned to death. But now this antipathy is held to be an acknowledged fact, and more so than the just-asserted unity of religion and philosophy.

Old as this antipathy is, however, the linkage of philosophy with religion is just as ancient. Already for the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists, still situated within the pagan world, the folk deities were not deities of phantasy but had become deities of thought. Afterward this linkage found a place in the work of the most eminent church fathers, who adopted an essentially conceptual approach in their religiosity, by setting out from the assumption that theology is religion together with a thinking, comprehending consciousness. The Christian church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This uniting of religion with philosophy was carried through even more fully in the Middle Ages. So far were they from believing that conceptual knowing might be injurious to faith that it was regarded as essential to the further development of faith itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—developed the definitions of the faith still further on the basis of philosophy.
it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. For the thinking spirit is what penetrates this object, the truth; it is thinking that enjoys the truth and purifies the subjective consciousness. Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God, as is religion. But each of them, religion as well as philosophy, is the service of God in a way peculiar to it (about which more needs to be said). They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. This is where the difficulties lie that impede philosophy’s grasp of religion; and it often appears impossible for the two of them to be united. The apprehensive attitude of religion toward philosophy and the hostile stance of each toward the other arise from this. It seems, as the theologians frequently suggest, that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it. This old antipathy stands before our eyes as something admitted and acknowledged, more generally acknowledged than their unity. The time seems to have arrived, however, when philosophy can deal with religion more impartially on the one hand, and more fruitfully and auspiciously on the other.

This linkage between them is nothing new. It already obtained among the more eminent of the church fathers, who had steeped themselves particularly in Neopythagorean, Neoplatonic, and Neoaristotelian philosophy. For one thing, they themselves first passed over to Christianity from philosophy; and for another, they applied that philosophical profundity of spirit to the teachings of Christianity. The church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of Christian doctrine, the development of a dogmatics. (Of course it is often said to be a pity that Christianity ever required a determinate content and a dogmatics. We shall have to say more later about the relationship [of the dogmatic content] to religious sensibility, to the purely intensive element in devotion.)

8. [Ed.] Hegel is presumably thinking in particular of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, even though in the sense of orthodox dogmatics the latter two do not count as church fathers, or do so only in a qualified way. Perhaps he is also thinking of Augustine. Nowhere can more exact information about the church fathers be obtained from his work.
INTRODUCTION

We can see the same linkage between theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages, too. Scholastic philosophy is identical with theology; theology is philosophy, and philosophy is theology. So far were they from believing that thinking, conceptual knowing, might be injurious to theology that it was regarded as necessary, as essential to theology itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—built up theology out of philosophy. Thus Anselm said: *cum ad fidem perveneris, negligentiae mihi esse videtur non intelligere quod credis.*

2. The Relationship of the Science of Religion to the Needs of Our Time

"Although it follows upon a period when the antipathy became

9. [Ed.] "When you have achieved faith, it seems to me to be negligence not to understand what you believe." This is an abbreviated quotation from memory, taken from Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, chap. 2: *Sicut rectus ordo exiget ut profunda Christianae fidei credamus, priusquam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere* (Migne *Patrologia Latina* 158.362b.) "As the right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith before we undertake to discuss them by reason; so to my mind it appears a neglect if, after we are established in the faith, we do not seek to understand what we believe" (translation by S. N. Deane, *St. Anselm: Basic Writings* [LaSalle, Ill., 1962], p. 179). While Hegel was familiar with the major works of Anselm—the *Cur Deus Homo*, the *Monologion*, and the *Proslogion*—and considered this eleventh-century theologian to be a seminal figure in the history of speculative thought about God, he probably knew Abelard only from the accounts in the histories of philosophy by Jacob Brucker, Dietrich Tiedemann, and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, to which he refers in commenting on Abelard in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.

10. *W₂ (MiscP)* adds: In constructing its world for itself over against religion, cognition would have made only a finite content its own. But in that it has developed itself further, i.e. into the true philosophy, it has the same content as religion.

But if in a preliminary way we now seek out the distinction between religion and philosophy as it comes to prominence within this unity of content, we find it to be as follows.

11. [Ed.] This heading, suggested by the summary statement in the opening paragraph (see n. 1), designates the longest section in the 1827 *Introduction*. It is not clearly organized and appears to be something of a grab bag of themes taken over and highlighted from the 1824 *Introduction*. For example, the first topic, the reduced doctrinal content of present-day theology, is a modification of the critique of historical theology in Sec. 2 of the 1824 lectures. The second topic, in which Hegel argues that the knowledge of God, while based on immediate experience,
once more a presupposition, the present day seems again to be more propitious for the linkage of philosophy and theology. In support of this view two circumstances must be underlined. The first concerns the content, the second the form. With reference also has cognitive content, further develops the critique of the theology of reason and the theology of feeling found in the same section of the 1824 *Introduction*. The argument that there can be no investigation of the cognitive faculty in advance of cognition draws upon one of the “preliminary questions” in Sec. 4 of 1824, namely, that there is no epistemological prolegomenon to philosophy that is not already speculative in character. Only the summary description of speculative method—which achieves a unification of opposites in which the element of difference is not extinguished but sublated—appears to be new. It is clear that in 1827 Hegel’s conflict with the philosophical and theological views of the time becomes the dominant theme of the *Introduction*. However, this polemic does not spill over into *The Concept of Religion* as it does in 1824, so it may well be that Hegel determined in 1827 to concentrate the polemic in the *Introduction*, allowing *The Concept of Religion* to be organized according to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God, quite apart from partisan considerations. Some material from Sec. A of the *Ms. Concept* is also included here—material of an introductory character no longer appropriate to the 1827 *Concept*.

12. [Ed.] A reference possibly to the confessionalism of the Lutheran Reformation with its attack on Scholastic thought, and certainly to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophies that sharpened the distinction between natural and revealed (positive) religion in a manner critical of the latter.

13. W₁ (*MiscP*) reads: Thus in accordance with all its base ramifications, the contemporary view unconcerned with knowledge of God does not hesitate, in the blind arrogance that is peculiar to it, to turn against philosophy. Yet philosophy is the liberation of spirit from that disgraceful abasement; and philosophy has drawn religion forth once more out of the level of profoundest suffering that it was forced to undergo from that standpoint. The very theologians who are still at home only in that state of vanity have dared to complain against philosophy for its destructive tendency, theologians who [themselves] no longer possess any of the content that is subject to possible destruction. In order to repulse these objections, which are not only unfounded but even more frivolous and unprincipled, we need only to look briefly to the way in which the theologians have rather done everything [they could] to dissolve the determinate character of religion. They have (1) thrust the dogmas into the background or declared them to be unimportant, or have (2) considered the dogmas only as alien definitions by other people and as mere phenomena from a history that is long gone. When we have reflected thus upon this aspect of the content, and have seen how philosophy reinstates it and renders it secure from the depredations of theology, then we shall (3) reflect upon the form of that standpoint, and shall see here how that orientation, which in its form is antagonistic to philosophy, is so ignorant about itself that it does not even know in what way it contains implicitly within itself the very principle of philosophy.
to the *content*, the reproach has usually been brought against philosophy that by it the content of the doctrine of the revealed, positive religion is suppressed, that through it Christianity is destroyed. Only a so-called natural religion⁴ and theology has been admitted in philosophy, i.e., a content that the natural light of reason could supply regarding God; but it was invariably considered as standing opposed to Christianity. At present this reproach that philosophy is destructive of dogma has been removed, and in fact the theology of our time, i.e. of the last thirty to fifty years, has on its own part effected this removal.

In recent theology very few of the dogmas of the earlier system of ecclesiastical confessions have survived or at least | retained the importance previously attributed to them, and others have not been set in their place. "One could easily arrive at the view"¹⁵ that a widespread, nearly universal indifference toward the doctrines of faith formerly regarded as essential has entered into the general religiousness of the public. For though Christ as reconciler and savior is still constantly made the focus of faith, nevertheless what formerly was called in orthodox dogmatics the work of salvation has taken on a significance so strongly psychological and so very prosaic that only the semblance of the ancient doctrine of the church remains. In lieu of the former dogmas we now behold in Christ merely "great energy of character and constancy of conviction, for the sake of which Christ deemed his life of no account."¹⁶ This is now the universal object of faith. Thus Christ is dragged down to the level of human affairs, not to the level of the commonplace but still to that of the human, into the sphere of a mode of action of which pagans such as Socrates have also been capable. And so, although Christ has remained the focal point of faith for many

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⁴ Ed. The idea of a "natural religion," as contrasted with revealed religion, is common throughout the Enlightenment. See in particular Herbert of Cherbury (with whose thought Hegel would not have been familiar), Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume. The idea of a "natural light of reason," however, may be traced back to Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, and Cicero.

¹⁵ W₂ (Var) reads (similar in W₁): One can easily convince oneself [of this] by considering what now actually passes for the dogmas of the church.

¹⁶ Ed. This quotation cannot be identified in its present form. Hegel may have conflated passages with which he was familiar from rationalistic exegesis and dogmatics in a fashion such as this.
people who are religious and also more profound in outlook, it must still seem that the most weighty doctrines have lost much of their interest, faith in the Trinity for example, or the miracles in the Old and New Testaments, etc. 17

If a large part of the educated public, even many theologians, had to declare with hand on heart whether they hold those doctrines of faith to be indispensable for eternal blessedness, or whether not believing them would have eternal damnation as its consequence, there can surely be no doubt what the answer would be. 18 “Eternal damnation” and “eternal blessedness” are themselves phrases that may not be used in so-called polite company; such expressions count as ἡπίπτα. 19 Even though one does not disavow them, one still would be embarrassed to have to declare oneself about them. 20 And if one has read the books of dogmatics, of

17. W₂ (1831) adds (similar in W₁): The divinity of Christ, i.e., the dogmatic element proper to the Christian religion, is set aside or reduced to something universal only. Indeed this did not only happen in the Enlightenment, but it happens also in the work of more pious theologians. Both parties agree that the Trinity may have entered Christian doctrine from the Alexandrian school, or from the Neoplatonists. But although it must be conceded that the church fathers studied Greek philosophy, it is still primarily immaterial where that doctrine came from. The question is solely whether it is true in and for itself. That point, however, is not investigated, and yet that doctrine is the fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion.

[Ed.] From the allusion to “more pious theologians,” as well as from the Preface to the 2d ed. of the Encyclopaedia (1827), we can assume that Hegel here has especially in mind F. A. G. Tholuck, whose Die speculative Trinitätstheorie des spätern Orients was published in 1826. Tholuck was convinced that the doctrine of the triad was widespread in Islamic thought and in late Greek philosophy, and that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is closely linked with Neoplatonism. In his Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhnung, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), Tholuck argues that, while the speculative idea of the Trinity may be “decorative timbering” (Fachwerk), it can never be the foundation of the house of faith (pp. 219–220). Hegel responds to this view critically in his letter to Tholuck of 3 July 1826 (Briefe 4/2:60–61).

18. [Ed.] The neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity is traceable to deism, the neologians (W. A. Teller, J. G. Töllner), and Schleiermacher.

19. [Ed.] Literally, “inexpressible.” W adds as an explanatory comment: “such things as one is averse to [or dreads] expressing.”

20. W (1831) has express in place of declare and adds: In the doctrinal theologies of these theologians we shall find that the dogmas have become very lean and shrunken up, though there may, to be sure, be a great flurry of words.
edification and sermons of our day, in which the basic doctrines of Christianity ought to be expounded or at any rate taken as fundamental, and one were obliged to pass judgment on whether in the greater part of current theological literature those doctrines are expressed in an orthodox sense and without ambiguity or escape hatches, then again there is no question what the answer would be.

-If now theology no longer places such importance on the positive doctrines of Christianity, or for that matter if through their interpretation these doctrines are enveloped in such a fog, then one impediment to the philosophical comprehension of dogmas drops away, which used to arise from the fact that philosophy was considered to be an opponent of the teachings of the church. If those doctrines have declined so sharply in their interest, then philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to them.²¹

The most important sign that these positive dogmas have lost much of their importance is that in the main these doctrines are treated historically.²² As far as this historical procedure is concerned, it deals with thoughts and representations that were had, introduced, and fought over by others, with convictions that belong to others, with histories that do not take place within our spirit, do not engage the needs of our spirit. What is of interest is rather how these things have come about in the case of others, the contingent way in which they were formed.²³ The absolute way in which

²¹. W (1831) reads: It seems that, in accord with the general education of most of them, the theologians themselves endow the principal doctrines of positive Christianity with the importance that was formerly ascribed to them (when they were even valued as principal doctrines) only after they have been enveloped in a fog of vagueness. Now if philosophy ever did count as the opponent of church doctrine, it can be an opponent no longer; for the doctrines whose ruin philosophy seemed to threaten are no longer valid in the universal conviction. So when it considers those dogmas in a conceptual manner, a great deal of the danger for philosophy from this quarter should therefore have been set aside, and philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to the dogmas that have declined so sharply in interest for the theologians themselves.

²². Precedes in L (1827?): This theology, which adopts only a historical attitude with respect to the cognition of God, and which is indeed a cornucopia of cognitions but only of an external sort, clings tightly to merely historical perspectives and piles up a mass of content as external information.

²³. L (1827?) adds: The subject is there dealing not with its own commitments to believe, with a cognition that should belong to it and be for its own benefit, but
these doctrines were formed—out of the depths of spirit—is forgotten, and so their necessity and truth is forgotten, too, and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. The historical procedure is very busy with these doctrines, though not with their content but rather with the external features of the controversies about them, with the passions that have attached themselves to them, etc. For this reason philosophy no longer has to face the reproach that it devalues the dogmas. Instead it suffers the reproach of containing within itself too much of the teachings of the church, "more than the generally prevailing theology of our time." 24

The other circumstance that seems to favor the renewed linkage of theology and philosophy concerns the form. Here indeed it is a question of the conviction of the age that God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings, that religion

with a cognition of the opinions and views of others, not with the thing itself; the thing itself would benefit anyone concerned with it. W, (Var) reads: formed and appeared; and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. W, (Var) reads: formed and appeared.

24. W (1831) reads: Here theology has by its own act been set in a sufficiently abject position. W, (1831) adds further: For this reason philosophy seems to be in little danger when it is reproached for treating the Christian dogmas in a thoughtful way, or indeed for opposing the church doctrines themselves. If there are now only a few dogmas, or if these dogmas are now only a matter of history, then philosophy could no longer be opposed to them, and then

25. W, (1831) reads: It is also quite correct that philosophy contains infinitely more than the more recent superficial theology. The latter is wholly built upon just that reflection for which philosophy will not grant any validity, and it reduces the positive doctrines to a minimum. The reinstatement of the authentic doctrine of the church must emanate from philosophy, for philosophy is what guides that vacuous reflective activity back to its ground, that is, philosophy is that in which it goes to the ground [i.e. perishes]. The one circumstance that can be called propitious for the philosophical consideration of religion concerned the content.

26. Similar in W, W, (MiscP) reads: Because of the emptiness of the standpoint we are considering, it might seem that we have only referred to the reproaches that it raises up against philosophy, in order to declare expressly that our own aim, which we, by contrast, shall not relinquish, is to do the opposite of what that standpoint holds to be ultimate—namely, to have cognition of God. Yet it still has in its form an implicit aspect in which it must actually hold a rational interest for us; and under this aspect the more recent stance of theology is even more propitious for philosophy. For bound up with the fact that all objective determinateness has collapsed into the inwardness of subjectivity, there is precisely the conviction
amounts just to this point, that the human being knows God immediately. This immediate knowing is called "religion," but also "reason" and "faith," too, though faith in a sense different from that of the church. All conviction that God is, and regarding what God is, rests, so it is surmised, upon this immediate revealedness in the human being, upon this faith. This general representation is now an established preconception. It implies that the highest or religious content discloses itself to the human being in the spirit itself, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, in this my own spirit, that faith has its root in the inner self or in what is most my own, that my inmost core is inseparable from it. This is the general principle,

27. [Ed.] While Hegel may also have Schleiermacher in mind at this point, in his view it was primarily Jacobi who laid the theoretical foundation for the theology of immediacy with the claim that all human knowledge derives from an attitude of immediate certainty that he called "faith." In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi wrote: "We have all been born into faith and must remain in faith, just as we have all been born into society and must remain in society. Totum parte prius esse necesse est. How can we strive for certainty if we are not already acquainted with it, and how can we be acquainted with it otherwise than by means of something that we already acknowledge with certainty? This leads to the concept of an immediate certainty that not only requires no grounds but utterly excludes every ground, and is purely and simply the representation itself harmonizing with the represented thing. Conviction based on grounds is a certainty at second hand ... If every truth-claim that does not spring from rational grounds is faith, then conviction based on rational grounds must itself come from faith and receive its force from faith alone" (Jacobi, Briefe über Spinoza, pp. 215–217 [Werke 4/1:210–211]). Jacobi's views are summed up in the epigram: "The element in which all human cognition and agency takes place is faith" (ibid., p. 228 [p. 223]). See also his David Hume, pp. 24 ff. (Werke 2:145 ff.). On Hegel's criticism of these views, see his Encyclopedia (1830), § 63 remark.

28. Thus L; similar in An; Hu reads: This contention is completely familiar and requires no further discussion. Follows in L (1827?): Later we shall discuss more precisely how it came about. For the present we take it in its direct sense, without any polemical orientation against philosophy, as the contention that the consciousness of God is immediately present in [human] spirit along with its consciousness of itself. W1 (Var) reads: All conviction ... in the human being. This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy (we will deal with that later), requires no proof, no corroborating. W1 (Var) reads: Regarded now from this standpoint, all knowledge, all conviction and piety, rests upon the fact that in [human] spirit as such the consciousness of God is immediately present along with its consciousness of itself. (a) This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy, is valid as such and requires no proof, no corroborating.
the way in which religious faith is defined in recent times as immediate intuition, as knowledge within me that absolutely does not come from without. Its effect is utterly to remove all external authority, all alien confirmation. What is to be valid for me must have its confirmation in my own spirit. The impetus can certainly come from without, but the external origin is unimportant. That I believe is due to the witness of my own spirit.

Now this being-present or manifesting of that content is the simple principle of philosophical cognition itself: namely, that our consciousness has immediate knowledge of God, that we have an absolutely certain knowledge of God's being. Not only does philosophy not repudiate this proposition, but it forms a basic determination within philosophy itself. In this way it is to be regarded as a gain, as a kind of good fortune, that basic principles of philosophy itself are active as general preconceptions in the universal [i.e. popular] mode of representation, so that the philosophical principle can more easily gain general assent among educated people.29

30[However, in the first place,] in regard to this immediate knowledge it is noteworthy that the principle does not stand still at this simple determinacy, this naive content. It does not express itself merely affirmatively. Instead the naive knowledge proceeds polemically against cognition and is especially directed against the cognition or conceptual comprehension of God. What it demands is not merely that one should believe, should know immediately. What it maintains is not simply that consciousness of God is conjoined with self-consciousness, but rather that the relationship to God is only and exclusively an immediate one. The immediacy of the connectedness is taken as precluding the alternative determination of

29. Thus also W₁, W₂ (MiscP) adds: In this general disposition of the spirit of the age, not only has philosophy therefore secured an outwardly favorable position (it has no dealings with what is external, least of all where philosophy and occupation with it exist as a state institution), but it is inwardly favored if its principle already lives of its own accord as an assumption in the spirit [of the people] and in their hearts. For philosophy has this principle in common with contemporary culture: that reason is the locus of spirit in which God reveals himself to human beings.

30. In B's margin: 8 May 1827

[Ed.] See below, n. 49.
mediation, and because it is a mediated knowledge philosophy is disparaged on the grounds that it is only a finite knowledge of the finite.

More precisely, the immediacy of this knowledge is supposed to reside above all in the fact that one knows that God is, not what God is. The expansion, the content, the fulfillment of the representation of God is thus negated. But what we call “cognition” involves knowing not only that an object is but also what it is; and knowing what it is, not just in a general way or having a certain acquaintance with it, some certitude about it, but knowing what its determinations are, what its content is, so that our knowing is a fulfilled and verified knowledge in which we are aware of the necessary connectedness of these determinations.

It is claimed that God cannot be cognized at all, but that we are only aware that God is; this we [supposedly] found in our consciousness. If we first set aside the polemical orientation of this claim and consider only just what is involved in the assertion of immediate knowledge, “it is this: that on the one hand it is our spirit itself that bears witness to this content, that the content does not come from without or only through instruction. On the contrary, our conviction about it rests on the assent of our own spirit, on our consciousness, that spirit finds this content within itself.” On the other hand, consciousness also relates itself to this content, so that this consciousness and this content, God, are inseparable. In fact it is this connection in general, this knowledge of God and the inseparability of consciousness from this content, that we call religion in general. But at the same time the implication in this assertion of immediate knowledge is that we ought to stop short with the consideration of religion as such—more precisely, with the consideration of this connection with God. There is to be no progressing to the cognitive knowledge of God, to the divine content

31. [Ed.] This standpoint is found in the contemporary philosophy originating from Jacobi; see esp. his Briefe über Spinoza, pp. 426–427 (Werke 4/2:155).

32. W (1831) reads: [it is] a self-limitation, which, with respect to its origin, is even acknowledged by philosophy, but then also resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy.
as this content would be divinely, or essentially, in God himself. In this sense it is further declared that we can know only our relation to God, not what God himself is. "Only our relation" falls within what is meant by religion generally.⁷³ That is why it is that nowadays we merely hear religion talked about but find no investigations into God's nature or what God might be within himself, how God's nature must be defined. God as such is not made the object [of inquiry] himself; God is not before us as an object of cognition, and knowledge does not spread out within this sphere. "Only our relation to God, or religion as such, is an object [of inquiry] for us. Our discussion concerns religion as such and does not, or at least not very much, concern God. Expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer. What is said is only that human beings ought to have religion. The connection religion has with philosophy and the state is discussed, but not God.⁷⁴

But if we elucidate what is implied in the thesis of immediate knowledge, what is immediately declared by it, then God himself is expressed in relation to consciousness in such a way that this relation is something inseparable or that we must consider both sides together, and this is the essential object of our consideration.⁷⁵ "This is itself the philosophical idea, and is not opposed to

33. [Ed.] Here Hegel draws the consequences of the contemporary assertion of the noncognizability of God as found in Kant and Jacobi. Perhaps he has specifically in mind Schleiermacher's view that the divine attributes do not denote "something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which we relate our feeling of absolute dependence to God." Der christliche Glaube, 1st ed., § 64; in the 2d ed., § 50, the concluding clause is revised to read: "... in which the feeling of utter dependence is to be related to him."

34. Similar in W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: and does not display differentiated determinations within it [i.e. in God as object of cognition], so that it is itself grasped as the relationship of these determinations and as relationship within its own self. God is not before us as object of cognition, but only our connection with God, our relationship to him. And while expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer, it is now demanded only that human beings ought to have religion or ought to abide in religion, and there is not supposed to be any advance to a divine content.

35. Thus B; L (1827?) adds (similar in W): We can, to be sure, distinguish subjective consciousness on the one hand, and God as object, God [viewed] objectively, on the other. This is an essential distinction in the entire doctrine of religion. But at the same time it is said that there is an unbreakable, essential relation between the two, and this is the important thing, not what one opines or fancies about God.
the philosophical concept.\textsuperscript{36} According to the philosophical concept God is \textit{spirit}, concrete; and if we inquire more precisely what spirit is, it turns out that the basic concept of spirit is the one whose development constitutes the entire doctrine of religion. If we ask for our consciousness a provisional account of what spirit is, the answer is that spirit is a self-manifesting, a being for spirit. \textit{Spirit is for spirit} and of course not merely in an external, contingent manner. Instead it \textit{is} spirit only insofar as it is \textit{for} spirit. This is what constitutes the concept of spirit itself. Or, to put the point more theologically, God’s spirit is [present] essentially in his community; God \textit{is} spirit only insofar as God is in his \textit{community}.\textsuperscript{17}

Because the inseparable unity of consciousness with God is affirmed in what immediate knowledge contains, this inseparability therefore contains what is implied in the concept of spirit: [namely,] that spirit is for spirit itself, that the treatment cannot be one-sided or merely treatment of the subject according to its finitude, i.e., according to its contingent life; instead it [must be] considered under the aspect in which it has the infinite absolute content as its object. When the subject is considered by itself (the subjective individual as such) it is considered in its finite knowing, its knowledge of the finite. By the same token it is also maintained regarding the other side of the relation that God is not to be considered in isolation, for that is not possible. One knows of God only in connection with consciousness.\textsuperscript{38}

"What has been stated are the basic characteristics that we can regard as immediate impressions and unmediated convictions of

\textsuperscript{36} Thus B; \textit{W}$_2$ (\textit{Var}) \textit{reads}: Now what this contention contains as its real kernel is the philosophical idea itself, except that it is held by immediate knowledge within a limitation that is resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy. \textit{W}$_1$ (\textit{Var}) \textit{reads}: If we set in relief what this contention contains, [we see] it is the philosophical idea itself.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{W}$_2$ (\textit{MiscP}) \textit{adds}: It is said that the world or the sensible universe must have onlookers and must be for spirit. And so God, too, must be for spirit all the more.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{W}$_1$ (1831) \textit{adds} (similar in \textit{W}$_2$): and thus the unity and inseparability of the two determinations, i.e., of knowledge of God and of self-consciousness, itself presupposes what is expressed in identity, and the dreaded identity is contained right in this unity and inseparability.
the age relating expressly to religion, to knowledge of God. Therefore only what are basic elements or fundamental concepts of philosophy of religion can be linked up with this foundation. This also provides us with an external justification for forging a path to our science without having to be polemical toward the views that supposedly stand in the way of philosophy. Certainly these contentions do oppose themselves to philosophical cognition, for there is no limit to that lack of awareness about the knowledge of God which is opposed to philosophy. But exactly those contentions, which for this reason maintain that they are contradicting philosophy, that they are contesting it and are most sharply opposed to it—if we look at their content, the determinate view they express, then we see that in themselves they exhibit agreement with that which they assail.

The result of the study of philosophy is that those walls of division, which are supposed to separate absolutely, become transparent; or that when we get to the bottom of things we discover

39. L (1827?) adds (similar in W1): I have taken them straightforwardly according to what they contain, and have left to one side their opposition from the standpoint of philosophical cognition. We are still only in the introduction.

40. W1 (Var) reads: Through this agreement with respect to the elements, to which attention has been drawn, an external justification is first of all provided in regard to our discussion.

41. Similar in W1; W2 (MiseP) reads: In fact we thus see the basic concept of philosophy present as a universal element within the culture of the age. And it is also evident here how philosophy does not stand above its age in the form of something completely different from the general determinateness of the age. Instead one spirit pervades actuality and philosophical thought, except that the latter is the true self-understanding of the actual. In other words, there is but one movement by which the age and philosophy themselves are borne along, the difference being simply that the determinateness of the age still appears to be present contingently, it still lacks justification, and so it can even yet stand in an unreconciled, hostile antithesis to that genuine and essential content, whereas philosophy, as justification of the principle, is also the universal peacemaking and reconciliation. Just as the Lutheran Reformation led the faith back to the primary centuries, the principle of immediate knowledge has led Christian cognition back to the primary elements. But if this reduction also causes the evaporation of the essential content at first, then it is philosophy that cognizes this principle of immediate knowledge itself as a content, and leads it on as such to its true unfolding within itself.
absolute agreement where we thought there was the most extreme antithesis. 42

More specifically, these contemporary impressions are polemical against the amplification of the inherent content. We are to believe in God, but in general are not to know what God is, are not to have any determinate knowledge of God. The possession of determinate knowledge is what is meant by "cognition." On this basis theology as such has been reduced to a minimum of dogma. Its content has become extremely sparse although much talking, scholarship, and argumentation go on. This tendency is principally directed against the mode of amplification called dogmatics. We can compare this shift in attitude to what was done for the purpose of the Reformation. Then the amplification of the system of hierarchy was contested, and the leading of Christianity back to the simplicity of the first Christian era was offered as the defining goal. Similarly, it is basically characteristic of the modern period that the doctrines of the Protestant church have been brought back to a minimum. But despite theology's reduction of its knowledge to a minimum it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its subject matter is becoming more extensive; the learning displayed in its manifold historical eloquence is highly accomplished. 43 Thus one is engaged not with one's own cognition but with cognition of other people's representations. We can compare this bustling about of theology with the work of the countinghouse clerk or cashier, because all the active bustle is concerned with the alien truths of others. 44 It will become

42. *Thus also W*, 5; *W*, 1 (1831) *adds:* One must know only what is here the essential category of thought. Faith is also a knowledge, but an immediate knowledge. Thus the antithesis reduces to the abstract determinations of immediacy and mediation, which we have to refer to only in logic where these categories of thought are considered according to their truth.

43. *L* (1827?) *adds:* But because this proliferating content is not developed from the concept, does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, or according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

44. *W* (1831) *adds the following, after giving the 1824 version of this analogy:* Theology of this kind does not find itself any longer in the domain of thought at all; it does not any longer deal with infinite thought in and for itself, but deals with
plain in our treatment of the science of religion that it is the peculiar concern of reason to form itself into an all-embracing intellectual realm. The main thing about this intellectual formation is that it occurs rationally, according to the necessity of the subject matter, of the content itself, not according to caprice and chance.|

Because it has thus contracted exclusively into the knowledge that God is, theology has extended its object to embrace ethical life and morality; and because this extension itself is not supposed to occur via cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, rather than according to necessity. This argumentative thinking makes some assumption or other, and proceeds according to the relationships of the understanding [employed in the kind] of reflection that we have developed within us through our education, without any criticism of these relationships. That approach is gaining ground in this science [theology]. In contrast, development by means of the concept admits of no contingency. That is just why it is so fervently denounced, because it chains us down to proceeding according to the necessity of the thing rather than according to fancies and opinions.

That argumentative method involves assumptions, which themselves can in turn be called in question. Yet the argumentative theology of the Christian church pretends nevertheless to possess a firm footing, asserting, “For us the firm footing is the Bible, it is the words of the Bible.” But against this one can quote the essential sense of the text, “the letter kills,” etc. One does not take the words [of the Bible] as they stand, because what is understood by the biblical “word” is not words or letters as such but the spirit with which they are grasped. For we know historically that quite

45. W, (1831) reads: Although theology has severely reduced its actual knowledge of God to a minimum, it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its range and subject matter is becoming more extensive. But because, in the case of this proliferating content, this does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

46. [Ed.] See 2 Cor. 3:6. “The written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.”
opposite dogmas have been derived from these words, that the most contrasting viewpoints have been elicited from the letter of the text because the spirit did not grasp it. In these instances appeal was to the letter, but the genuine ground is the spirit.

The words of the Bible constitute an unsystematic account; they are Christianity as it appeared in the beginning. It is spirit that grasps the content, that spells it out. How it is done depends on how spirit is disposed, on whether it is the right and true spirit that grasps the words. This true spirit can only be the one that proceeds within itself according to necessity, not according to assumptions. This spirit that interprets must legitimate itself on its own account, and its proper legitimation is the subject matter itself, the content, that which the concept substantiates.

Hence the authority of the canonical faith of the church has been in part degraded, in part removed. The symbolum or regula fidei itself is no longer regarded as something totally binding but instead as something that has to be interpreted and explained from the Bible. But the interpretation depends on the spirit that explains. The absolute footing is just the concept. To the contrary, by means of exegesis such basic doctrines of Christianity have been partly set aside and partly explained in quite lukewarm fashion. Dogmas such as those of the Trinity and the miracles have been put in the shadows by theology itself. Their justification and true affirmation can occur only by means of the cognizing spirit, and for this reason much more of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in theology itself as such.

49 We should note in the second place the consequence of imposing

47. W (1831) adds after an interpolation from the 1824 lectures: Whether the Bible has been made the foundation more for honor's sake alone or in fact with utter seriousness, still the nature of the interpretative explanation involves the fact that thought plays a part in it. Thought explicitly contains definitions, principles, and assumptions, which then make their own claims felt in the activity of interpreting.
48. [Ed.] See above, nn. 17, 18.
49. In B's margin: 10 May 1827
[Ed.] If the following comments on investigating the cognitive faculty itself are "in the second place," then presumably what is first, in the discussion of the form of religious thought, is the preceding analysis of the immediate knowledge of God culminating in the remarks on its assumptions in relation to biblical authority (see above, n. 30). Both points are marked by a date notation in the margin of H.
upon philosophy, in particular upon philosophy of religion, the
demand that before we embark upon cognitive knowing we must
investigate the nature of the cognitive faculty itself; only this in-
vestigation of the instrument would show for certain whether we
can rightfully try for cognition of God. We wanted just to proceed
to the thing itself without turning to further preliminaries. But this
question lies so close to our concern that it must be attended to. It
seems to be a fair demand that one should test one's powers and
examine one's instrument before setting to work.\(^{50}\) But plausible as
this demand may appear, it proves to be no less unjustified and
empty. With such analogies it is often the case that forms that suit
one context do not suit another. How should reason be investigated?
Doubtless rationally. Therefore this investigation is itself a rational
cognizing. For the investigation of cognition there is no way open
save that of cognition. We are supposed to cognize reason, and
what we want to do is still supposed to be a rational cognizing. So
we are imposing a requirement that annuls itself. This is the same
demand as the one in the familiar anecdote in which a Scholastic
declares that he won't go into the water until he has learned to
swim.\(^{51}\)

50. [Ed.] Hegel's thought is fundamentally at odds with a procedure that grants
to epistemology, whether of the Cartesian, the empiricist, or the critical variety, a
prior and privileged position within the philosophical enterprise. Cf. his critique of
this procedure in the opening paragraphs of the Introduction to the Phenomenology
of Spirit, where his principal targets (as in this passage) are the critical philosophies
of Kant and Reinhold.

51. [Ed.] This anecdote is contained in a collection of witticisms written in Greek,
known as \(\phi \lambda \omega \gamma \ell \varepsilon \lambda \varsigma\) ("Friend of Laughter"), collected by Hierocles of Alexandria
and Philagrios the Grammarian in late antiquity. See Philologos der Lachfreund:
Scholastic who wanted to swim was nearly drowned. He swore never again to go
into the water until he had learned to swim." In the 1824 Introduction Hegel alludes
to the same anecdote, but, according to G, uses the term \(\text{Gascogner} \) ("Gascon")
instead of \(\text{Scholastikus} \), thus appearing to convert it into an ethnic joke about
Frenchmen from Gascony, reputedly noted for their boasting. However, such a
change makes little sense, and since only G gives this version he probably simply
misunderstood Hegel or reconstructed the anecdote later from memory incorrectly.
Hegel also used the anecdote in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy; a student
notebook of 1825–26 gives the Greek form \(\sigma \chi \omega \lambda \omega \pi \tau \chi \varsigma \), as does the 2d ed. of
these lectures in the Werke (see History of Philosophy 3:428), while the 1st ed.
simply reads: "a man who wanted to swim" (Werke 15:555).
Besides, in philosophy of religion we have as our object God himself, *absolute reason*.\(^{52}\) Since we know God [who is] absolute reason, and investigate this reason, we cognize it, we behave cognitively. Absolute spirit is knowledge, the determinate rational knowledge of its own self. Therefore when we occupy ourselves with this object it is immediately the case that we are dealing with and investigating rational cognition, and this cognition is itself rational conceptual inquiry and knowledge. So the [critical] requirement proves to be completely empty. Our *scientific cognition is itself the required investigation* of cognitive knowing.

The second circumstance\(^{53}\) requiring discussion at this point is the following observation. We should recall here what we said by way of introduction, that on the whole religion is the highest or ultimate sphere of human consciousness, whether as feeling, volition, representation, knowledge, or cognition. It is the absolute result, the region into which the human being passes over as that of absolute truth. In order to meet this universal definition, consciousness must already have elevated itself into this sphere transcending the finite generally, transcending finite existence, conditions, purposes, and interests—in particular, transcending all finite thoughts and finite relationships of every sort. In order to be within the sphere of religion one must have set aside these things, forgotten them. In contrast with these basic specifications, however, it very frequently happens when philosophy in general and philosophizing about God in particular are criticized, that finite thoughts, relationships of limitedness, and categories and forms of the finite are introduced in the service of this discourse. Opposition that draws upon such finite forms is directed against philosophy generally and especially against the highest kind, the philosophy of religion | in particular. Belonging to such finite forms is the immediacy of knowing or the “fact of consciousness.” Examples of

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52. L (1827?) adds: God is essentially rational, a rationality that, as spirit, is in and for itself.

53. [Ed.] The ensuing paragraphs challenge a simplistic application of the Kantian categories of finitude to the religious object. Perhaps this makes them the “second circumstance” in the passage on investigating the cognitive faculty, the first being the more general discussion of the preceding two paragraphs.
such categories include the antitheses of finite and infinite and of subject and object, abstract forms that are no longer in place in that absolute abundance of content that religion is. They must of course occur in our science, for they are moments of the essential relationship that lies at the basis of religion. But the main thing is that their nature must have been investigated and cognized long beforehand. If we are dealing with religion scientifically, this primarily logical cognition must lie behind us. We must long since have finished with such categories. The usual practice, however, is to base oneself on them in order to oppose the concept, the idea, rational cognition. These categories are employed entirely uncritically, in a wholly artless fashion, just as if Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* were nonexistent, a book that put them to the test and arrived in its own way at the result that they can serve only for the cognition of phenomena and not of the truth. In religion, however, one is not dealing with phenomena but with the absolute content. How totally improper, indeed tasteless, it is that categories of this kind are adduced against philosophy, as if one could say something novel to philosophy or to any educated person in this way, as if anyone who has not totally neglected his education would not know that the finite is not the infinite, that subject is different from object, immediacy different from mediation. Yet this sort of cleverness is brought forward triumphantly and without a blush, as if here one has made a discovery.

"That these forms" are different everyone knows; but that these

54. *L* (1827?) adds (similar in *W*): In the spirit (or in the disposition that has to do with religion) determinations wholly other than such meager ones as finitude and the like are present, and yet what is supposed to be important in religion is subjected by argumentative critique to determinations of this kind.

55. [Ed.] Hegel refers here to his criticism of the categories of the understanding in his *Science of Logic*.

56. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 269, B 571, B 611.

57. *W*, MiscP/Var? adds: But the Kantian philosophy seems in the view of that argumentative thinking to have come into existence only so that we might operate all the more unabashedly with those categories.

58. *Similar in W*; *W*, MiscP/Var? reads: Here we merely note the fact that such determinations as finite and infinite, subject and object (and this always constitutes the foundation of that clever and cheeky chatter)
determinations are still at the same time inseparable is another matter. There is reluctance to ascribe to the concept this power, though it can be encountered even in physical phenomena. We know that in the magnet the south pole is quite distinct from the north pole, and yet they are inseparable. We also say of two things, for example, that they are as different as heaven and earth. It is correct that these two are plainly different, but they are inseparable. We cannot point out earth apart from the heavens, and vice versa. Immediate and mediated knowledge are distinct from one another, and yet only a very modest investigation is needed in order to see that they are inseparable. Hence, before one is ready to proceed to philosophy of religion, one must be done with such one-sided forms. From these considerations it can easily be seen how difficult it is for a philosopher to engage in discussion with those who oppose philosophy of religion in this fashion; for they display too great an ignorance and are totally unfamiliar with the forms and categories in which they launch their attack and deliver their verdict upon philosophy. Being unfamiliar with the inner spirit of the concepts, they bluntly declare that immediacy is surely something different from mediation. They utter such platitudes as something novel, but in so doing they also assert that immediate knowledge exists in isolation, on its own account, wholly unaffected, without having reflected upon these subjects, without having paid attention to their outer nature or inner spirit to see how these determinations are present in them. This kind of opposition to philosophy has the

59. Thus also W.; W.; (MiscP) adds: Actuality is not accessible to them, but alien and unknown. The gossip that they direct in hostility against philosophy is therefore school chatter, which saddles itself with empty categories that have no content; whereas we in the company of philosophy are not in the so-called “school” but in the world of actuality, and we do not find in the wealth of its determinations a yoke in which we might be confined, but we move freely within them. And then those who contest and disparage philosophy are even incapable of comprehending a philosophical proposition through their finite thought. Just when they perhaps repeat its very words they have distorted it, for they have not comprehended its infinity but have dragged in their finite relationships instead. Philosophy is so patient and painstaking that it carefully investigates its opponent’s position. Admittedly that is necessary according to its concept, and it is only satisfying the internal impulse of its concept when it cognizes both itself and what is opposed to it (verum index sui et falsi [“truth is the touchstone of itself and of the false”]: Spinoza, Opera 4:124,
tedious consequence that in order to show people that their con-
tentions are self-contradictory one must first go back to the alphabet
of philosophy itself. But the thinking spirit must be beyond such
forms of reflection. It must be acquainted with their nature, with
the true relationship that obtains within them, namely the infinite
relationship, in which their finitude is sublated.

Only slight experience is needed to see that where there is im-
mediate knowledge there is also mediated knowledge, and vice
versa. Immediate knowledge, like mediated knowledge, is by itself
completely one-sided. The true is their unity, an immediate knowl-
edge that likewise mediates, a mediated knowledge that is at the
same time internally simple, or is immediate reference to itself. That
one-sidedness makes these determinations finite. Inasmuch as it is
sublated through such a connection, it is a relationship of infinity.
It is the same with object and subject. In a subject that is internally
objective the one-sidedness disappears; the difference emphatically
does not disappear, for it belongs to the pulse of its vitality, to the
impetus, motion, and restlessness of spiritual as well as of natural
life. Here is a unification in which the difference is not extinguished,
but all the same it is sublated.60 |