Abstract
In this article I examine Dewey’s critique of Kant in light of recent interpretations of Dewey’s early works, as well as of his 1915 work, *German Philosophy and Politics*. My aim is to bring the earlier criticisms of Kant in line with the later ones. I make three claims in this paper: first, that Dewey’s critique of Kant was indebted to Hegel as much as to the neo-Hegelians; second, that there is a continuous thread between the early criticisms and the later ones, as represented by *German Philosophy and Politics*; third, that Dewey’s critique of Kant portrays Kant as more of a transitional philosopher, one wedded to experience over and against absolute idealism, than is commonly recognized.

Introduction
In 1884, Dewey left Johns Hopkins with a Ph.D. in philosophy—one of the very first graduates of the department. But a diploma was not the only tangible Dewey leaves with. His two brief years at Hopkins suffuse him with two seemingly contradictory streams of thought: on the one hand, neo-Hegelian idealism, on the other, empirical psychology. It would be many years before Dewey was able to develop from this something unique and when he did, empirical psychology would emerge triumphant. However, as Dewey himself says, there has always remained that ‘Hegelian bacillus’ in his thinking.1 Nowhere is this more evident than in his criticism of the thinking, both metaphysical and moral, of Immanuel Kant. Dewey’s Hegelian affliction flares up whenever he is calls upon to discuss Kant’s thought.

A central criticism of Kant is that he lacks a proper *psychology* of experience. This lack, noted by Hegel and his successors, concerns the ontological and transcendental underpinnings of Kant’s concepts of experience; the pure, transcendental, a priori nature of his categories. As
Kant does not draw these from experience, Dewey criticizes him as producing a rift between the existentially real world and the perceiving knower. Dewey feels that Kant, in searching for a solution as to how to bring the two realms together, strikes upon the idea of a transcendental self. This self brings itself to bear upon sense-material through the categories of understanding. These categories are pure, a priori logical rules for the ordering of sensory material (intuitions). An experience is created when the two realms are conjoined. The ideal realm of the categories is parasitic upon the real realm of sensory material. And this poses a dilemma. For the categories to function in the construction of an experience, they must have *prima facie* an object at their disposal, and an idea of what the object should be that does not itself participate in the construction of the experience. They must, in short, have an idea of the object that is predetermined in its form. This, suggests Dewey, drives Kant to the conclusion that there must be a noumenal object that is not experienced, that serves as an ideal object for the construction of all possible objects in experience.

Dewey completes his doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins on Kant’s psychology under the supervision of the neo-Hegelian, G.S. Morris. He is at the time of this study committed to neo-Hegelian idealism. He reads almost the entirety of Kant’s work in the original German under the tutelage of H.A.P. Torrey at the University of Vermont. Acquainted with Kant in the philosophical German, he is also intimately familiar with broadly idealistic philosophers in England and on the continent, including Edward and John Caird and T.H. Green. It is at this time that Dewey begins his lifelong criticism of Kant. While remaining faithful to the spirit of idealism, Dewey rejects the fixed dialectic of Kant’s critical system in favor of the “dynamic” of Hegel. Dewey comes to view with suspicion the claims that theoretical reason could and should be divorced from practical reason. These he reunites in an absolutistic idealism. Over the period of approximately six years, Dewey constructs what is fundamentally a Hegelian critique of Kant. Although Dewey’s allegiance to Hegel would eventually evaporate, the Hegelian—sounding criticisms directed at Kant remained.

There is substantial accumulated textual and historical evidence for the above reading of Dewey’s early thinking on Kant. This view, generally speaking, is the received one of Dewey’s early idealist development and has only recently and forcefully been challenged. John Shook has undertaken a thorough analysis of Dewey’s absolute idealism and subsequent experimentalism in his book, *Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*. Tracing Dewey’s development from an absolute idealist to an instrumentalist and experimentalist, Shook discusses at length Dewey’s relationship with Kantian and neo-Kantian thought through an examination of the earliest articles of Dewey’s absolute idealist period, together with his first textbook, *Psychology*. I don’t want to repeat Shook’s analysis of this topic; however, it will do to summarize Shook’s arguments and findings so that the reader may distinguish my claims from his in what follows.
According to Shook, Dewey never was a Kantian. It is safe to say that he was never a neo-Kantian either, unlike T.H. Green. He was a neo-Hegelian. Shook claims that the transition to active human experience, to a functionalist psychology, and to experimentalism “did not wrench his [Dewey’s] philosophy away from idealism, just away from absolute idealism.” As such, Dewey sets his project apart from the twin “failures” current in much late 19th century philosophy: realism and empiricism. “Realism stood for scientific materialism or its cousin, Cartesian/Kantian dualism. Empiricism stood for psychological subjectivism or its cousin, solipsism. Neither realism nor empiricism were acceptable options for those educated in post-Kantian idealism.” Dewey in fact keeps his idealism and it is in the guise of experimentalism and functionalism, that he does so. For Dewey and Shook, T.H. Green is the best embodiment of neo-Kantianism. Dewey’s issues with Green are first and foremost with the dualism of self and world; the self’s progress to (moral) perfection; the presence of a faculty psychology of the mind and an empiricism in which consciousness recreates itself through sense-experiences. In sum, Dewey criticizes Green for being un-organic and un-holistic, and these criticisms are the criticisms Dewey levels against Kantian philosophy generally.

In contrast to Kant and neo-Kantianism, Dewey’s neo-Hegelian absolute idealism (because it is indebted to extant neo-Hegelian scholarship) and absolute idealism is superior. Neo-Hegelianism does not admit fixed dualisms, preferring dynamic ‘movements’ of consciousness to Kant’s twelve universal categories of the mind; it does not posit a self disconnected from the world, preferring an organic interaction of self and environment, and it rejects faculty psychology for a coherentist account of mind and learning in which ‘emergence,’ and later, ‘reproduction,’ of consciousness and self, occurs. Subsequent changes in Dewey’s thinking lead him to reject neo-Hegelian absolute idealism because, as Dewey notes, it places the absolute above the social, into a realm of the unknown, whereby the absolute becomes a question-begging postulate. In fact, Dewey finds, the social is the final and proper end of the self.

Two issues intrigue me, here. The first is Dewey’s relationship with the extant idealists, particularly G.S. Morris, T.H. Green, and Edward and John Caird. The second is Shook’s nomenclature of idealisms: neo-idealism, neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, and absolute idealism. Dewey is furthest from T.H. Green in Shook’s exegesis. Falling somewhere in between is G.S. Morris. Dewey is closest to the Caird brothers—Edward and John. Green was closest to Kant. Morris and the Cairds are ‘closer’ to Hegel, as they reject the dualisms that Green keeps in his accounts of the self and moral perfectionist. Dewey distinguishes himself from all of these primarily in his accounts of functionalist psychology that owes a great debt to Wilhelm Wundt (who, incidentally, is also given the title, idealist). This, though, would emerge only in time.

Neo-Kantians fall prey to dualisms: the dualism of self over against world; the dualism of categories over against sensations; the dualism of
moral laws over against drives, desires, emotions; the dualism of the moral ought over and against existing social conduct; and the subsequent postulates designed to make the philosophy hang together, such as the Thing-in-Itself, that are unable to be operationalized. It is not too much of a stretch to say that neo-Kantianism is best defined by its tendency to pull organically existing entities apart, and for Dewey’s various philosophical transformations as attempts to re-settle these in organic wholes. To be a neo-Hegelian means not only to follow Hegel over Kant (which it does) but to construe the nature of the self and world as organic (though not necessarily naturalistic—one of Dewey’s criticisms of extant neo-Hegelianism). It means to see categories as dynamic and evolving; not fixed and ready-made. It means to see consciousness, self-consciousness and universal and absolute consciousness as thick, rich, many-leveled, and textured, rather than simple, bare, and formal. It means to bridge the divide between the individual, society, and God, or, as Dewey would soon come to say, the self and society.

I do not wish to reproduce Shook’s compelling arguments demonstrating that Dewey is never a Kantian or neo-Kantian. I believe Shook is correct, and this on the evidence of Dewey’s texts. There are areas that Shook underexplores though, that remain to be discussed. First of all, Shook dispels the possibility that Dewey draws from Hegel. For Shook, Dewey draws his inspiration and his arguments from the neo-Hegelians extant, and generally speaking, not from Hegel. This is so even though Dewey is very familiar with Hegel. In particular, Dewey does not draw from Hegel’s Logic. While this may be true, I think it is fruitful to look at Hegel’s Logic, however briefly, to see what specific criticisms of Kant Hegel has in mind. I argue that there is a strong line of argument running from Hegel, to Morris, through to Caird, and Dewey. What this argument is and how it plays out in Dewey I shall show in what follows. This brings Hegel more fully into the fold than I believe Shook allows.

Second, it is worthwhile to ask whether anything of Kant is left over. Shook inclines to gloss over this possibility as a textual examination of Dewey’s development seems to suggest that neo-Hegelian idealism does all the intellectual work required. Nevertheless there is an element of Kant that Dewey thought important enough to maintain—even over and against Hegel: this, I believe, is Kant’s admonition regarding percepts and concepts: in an experience, the two do not outrun each other. Notably, consciousness is never not present in an experience, though what they do and how they operate, differs for Kant and Dewey. There is for both, though, always a level of awareness acting to bind experiences had, together. This is absent in Hegel’s Logic until the discussion of the Notion, and in his discussion of sense-certainty in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, it has to be projected back from absolute knowledge, to the beginning. But if this is the case, the question of whether this awareness is wholly organic, arises. Regardless of Kant’s positing of a thing-in-itself or a transcendental object as a ground for the categories, the idea that an experience is an active, pluralistic affair, remains. This, I believe, is part of what leads Dewey to call Kant a ‘transitional...
philosopher.' In what ways and senses is he transitional? My claim is that Kant is the first to begin the fusion of mind and world. Though Dewey does not think that this extends to Kant’s moral theory, recent textual work on Kant suggests otherwise.

Dewey provides a genetic account of Kant’s contribution to the history of philosophy and an explanation of Kant’s (and the Enlightenment’s) fascination with the freedom of the individual on the one hand, and the need for formalism on the other. Kant, seen in this light, is a transitional figure, a thinker on the way to a full-fledged naturalistic conception of human nature and human interactions. Though Kant is to be applauded for raising the question of supreme importance—the question of authority and despotism, through his discussion of the universal law, humanity, and the kingdom of ends, nevertheless, the artificial structure Kant builds to make the claim for freedoms is itself too steeped in supernaturalism and metaphysics to pull away from authoritarianism. Dewey develops this idea in a number of later works, but the earliest and strongest is found in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Dewey claims that early modern philosophy is too wedded to classical metaphysics. While the focus shifts to issues of knowledge, the idealism that characterizes classical metaphysics remains. Dewey puts it this way,

Earlier modern philosophy . . . had the problem of reconciling the traditional theory of the rational and ideal basis, stuff and end of the universe with the new interest in individual mind and the new confidence in its capacities. It was in a dilemma. On the one hand, it had no intention of losing itself in a materialism which subordinated man to physical existence and mind to matter—especially just at the moment when in actual affairs man and mind were beginning to achieve genuine rule over nature. On the other hand, the conception that the world as it stood was an embodiment of a fixed and comprehensive Mind or Reason was uncongenial to those whose main concern was with the deficiencies of the world and with an attempt to remedy them. The effect of the objective theological idealism that had developed out of classic metaphysical idealism was to make the mind submissive and acquiescent. The new individualism chafed under the restrictions imposed upon it by the notion of a universal reason which had once and for all shaped nature and destiny.

Dewey continues,

In breaking away from antique and medieval thought, accordingly, early modern thought continued the older tradition of a Reason that creates and constitutes the world, but combined it with the notion that this Reason operates through the human mind, individual or collective. . . In Kant as everybody knows the two strains [of empiricism and rationalism] came together; and the theme of the formation of the knowable world by means of a thought that operated exclusively through the human knower became explicit. Idealism ceased to be metaphysical and cosmic in order to become epistemological and personal.
Dewey claims that this period represents merely a transitional stage. “It tried,” Dewey claims “to put the new wine in the old bottles. It did not achieve a free and unbiased formulation of the meaning of the power to direct nature’s forces through knowledge—that is, purposeful, experimental action acting to reshape beliefs and institutions. The ancient tradition was still strong enough to project itself unconsciously into men’s ways of thinking, and to hamper and compromise the expression of the really modern forces and aims.”

The bulk of the late criticisms Dewey levels at Kant and Kantian thought have their genesis in his earlier, neo-Hegelian writings. There is the culmination of a line of thinking, beginning with Hegel and continuing with British Neo-Hegelians and G. S. Morris. This line of thinking, this criticism of Kant, is a direct descendant of Hegel’s, even though Dewey drew mainly from extant neo-Hegelians in making his claims. Dewey carries on this criticism in many of his later works. I shall examine Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics closely later in this paper, and note that, despite the polemical nature of that work, many of the criticisms therein have their basis in the work that Dewey does in his earlier, neo-Hegelian writings. I shall also give a more detailed account of Dewey’s arguments against Kant in that particular work than has heretofore been provided.

The Early Years

The Central Theses of Kant

I begin with a short discussion of Kant’s central theses of transcendental idealism and the transcendental deduction, as well as the thing-in-itself. In fine, transcendental idealism is the claim that cognition cannot trespass the boundaries of sense and that reason has no business involving itself in attempts to construct cognitions of God, freedom, and immortality. We cannot cognize intellectual objects, or noumena, though we can think them, because we only construct our cognitions in space/time and this is precisely what is absent in intellectual objects such as God. These ideas must be consigned a noumenal or intellectual realm that only Practical Reason (moral law) can operate in. Our knowledge is empirically real: we construct empirically real objects in space and time by bringing percepts and concepts together.

Though Kant is anxious to say that concepts do not outrun percepts and percepts, concepts, he requires a proof of our empirical cognitions. This proof is supplied by way of deductions. There are three possible ways to deduce concepts of experience. The first is what might be called “the empirical deduction,” the second, “the metaphysical deduction,” and the third, “the transcendental deduction.” A deduction for Kant is just an isolation of the ground or substrate of a proposition, statement, or judgment. Empirical deductions, accordingly, will have an empirical ground as their basis; metaphysical deductions a metaphysical (logical) ground as their basis, and transcendental deductions, a transcendental (a priori, pure, necessary) ground as their basis.
Now empirical deductions of the concepts of any possible experience (for this is what Kant is after) are ruled out. That is to say, we can have no empirical ground for any sort of knowledge, statement, or proposition because the very contingency of the empirical ground’s nature precludes it, by definition, from being a ground.\textsuperscript{18} The metaphysical deduction is given more treatment. Kant’s task in the metaphysical deduction is to derive the table of categories of pure understanding from the table of judgments.\textsuperscript{19} That is, the table of judgments are said to ground the table of categories such that the table of categories function in their use as the table of judgments. Kant puts it this way: “In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general \textit{a priori}, as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured by these functions.”\textsuperscript{20} But this cannot be a proof of judgments, let alone categories. For though the table of judgments shows that judgments operate according to categories, yet the categories are themselves dependent on something prior, and we do not yet know what that prior something is, let alone what grounds this something prior.

Transcendental deductions are quite different. The ground for a transcendental deduction must obviously be transcendental. This rules out any empirical ground, such as experience, or in the case of a judgment of taste, interest. But the ground must also not rest on metaphysical presumptions, such as the table of judgments do. At best, the judgments can be shown to rely on categories, but this cannot be a proof that categories are necessary and sufficient conditions of judgments. The ground for the categories of understanding must be universal, \textit{a priori}, and necessary. The transcendental unity of apperception is just the combination of the manifold of representations in one consciousness.\textsuperscript{21} Put another way, it acts to unify. It functions to unify the experience into one total field. It does so by creating \textit{out of itself} the possibility that the manifold of representations is \textit{my} representation. It is the principle that allows the manifold of intuition to be combined in thoroughgoing unity with the categories of the understanding. The unity of the apperception is said to be the ground for the deduction of the pure categories of the understanding: without the unification that consciousness (I think) provides, the categories could not combine with their intuitions in thoroughgoing unity. What we have here is a deduction of a transcendental principle (categories) via another transcendental principle (unity of apperception).

Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception, the “I think that accompanies all of my representations.”\textsuperscript{22} He also equates this with self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is the activity of combining representations, and it is this activity that is the possibility for all judgments of experience. Kant’s self is thus a formal self, in that it is logically simple and self-predicating. It is a bare identity statement, non-contradictory, yet having no ‘matter’ or ‘content’.
Kant does not appear to admit that the thing-in-itself has the power that Dewey claims on his behalf. The thing-in-itself, in the context of theoretical reason alone, seems to function as a *limit condition*; a *boundary concept*. It is only in the context of Practical Reason that the thing-in-itself (the noumenon) is accorded transcendental powers. But with respect to Practical Reason, the thing-in-itself is first and foremost a Law; an objective principle. Though Kant thinks we are required to ‘think’ an object behind phenomena, this (moral) object is nothing other than the objective principle that we *must think* an object behind an object.23 This is so because we simply do not have the sort of intuition required to claim cognition of such an object. What we have is cognition of appearances only; not intelligible entities. Our appearances and representations do not correspond to something ‘out there’ that is original and that can be metaphysically known. Though Kant claims that we are subject to ‘double affection,’—that we are affected both by sensations and by things-in-themselves, this argument can only work as a *reductio ad absurdum*; for there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves. The argument, therefore, stands on principle, not evidence.

Here, I examine three closely related “objects” that Kant supposedly turns to for the ontological foundations of his theory of Understanding. These are the transcendental object (in the earlier A edition), the noumenon, and the thing in itself. According to Hegel, Morris, and Caird (and Dewey), it is precisely these that are created to bridge the gulf that separates the real from the ideal, and further, allows Kant the opportunity to introduce a transcendental mechanism directly into his constructions of experience. Before discussing transcendental objects, I think it proper that the distinction between an empirical object, on the one hand, and a transcendental object, on the other be shown, lest there be any confusion about the radical difference that separates the two. The empirical object is the object of experience. This is the object formed when the manifold of intuition is “brought under” a rule (in what Kant calls the threefold synthesis of the A edition and in the combination of the manifold of intuition in the B edition). It is also appropriate to call these objects *representations*. They are not pure concepts; rather they are (simply) the combination of the categories and the form and matter of intuition. This is not to say that pure concepts *cannot* have an object. For they most certainly can and, as we shall see, do. But these objects of the understanding are not empirical inasmuch as they admit no sensibility. Empirical concepts are entirely of experience and are nothing outside of it.

By contrast, the transcendental object is *not* an object of experience. For in the “Transcendental Analytic,” Kant argues: “All representations as representations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of other representations in turn.Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them, which is immediately related to the object, is called intuition. However, these appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which
therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = X." 24 Now this transcendental object, not being an object of experience, is rather a pure concept of an object.25 Kant argues, “... this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold through a priori common function of the mind for combining it in one representation. 26 What I believe Kant is saying is that the transcendental object is not really a [singular] object. Rather, it is the pure concept of objectivity; a state that binds together all possible objects in general and thereby is given prior to any experience.

The transcendental object is a ground and the necessary condition for the experience of all other objects. The transcendental object, however, does not lie in a relation of cause and effect to these objects because only objects of experience in thoroughgoing interconnection can behave according to this analogy. Kant makes this claim in his elucidation of the second Analogy of Experience. Therefore the transcendental object must relate to these objects in some other way. As it cannot be a sensible cause of representations, Kant allows that it is a non-sensible cause.27 And this nonsensible “cause” is none other than the condition of all future causation. That is, the transcendental object functions as an intelligible “cause” of all appearances in general for the purpose of the unification of the thought of a manifold. “Thinking is the action of relating given intuitions to an object. If the manner of this intuition is not given in any way, then the object is merely transcendental, and the concept of the understanding has none other than a transcendental use, namely the unity of thought of a manifold in general. Now through a pure category, in which abstraction is made from any condition of sensible intuition as the only one that is possible for us, no object is determined, rather only the thought of an object in general is expressed in accordance with different modi.” 28

The transcendental object certainly seems to operate from outside of intu-ition, of experience, yet it directs that experience in the manner of an intelligible cause that seems to artificially bridge the gulf between the ideal and the real. When Kant comes to write the section “On the Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena,” he changes his mind about the feasibility of the transcendental object. Kant recognizes that his notion of the transcendental object is problematic, and his corrective lays in the new notion of a noumenon, which, though in keeping with some aspects of the older transcendental object, departs from it in several important ways.

Before I examine the noumenon, I want to first examine the characteristics of its opposite; a phenomenon. Kant argues that phenomena are objects to us as they appear (Kant 1996a, A 258). Phenomena are described as “beings of sense...” 29 In his marginalia of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states “One can give the possibility of a thing only through
intuition, either empirical or a priori intuition. The former is empirical, the latter is at least sensible. Both therefore pertain to phaenomena.” For Kant, “phaenomena” is a term that applies to appearances, representations, objects of sense, and objects of intuition, such as e.g. a geometer’s triangle. Objects left out of this description are objects that do not conform to, or participate in, some experience. Objects such as the transcendental object or any object that is a pure concept without a corresponding intuition, one not constructed in experience, would therefore, according to his definition, be exempt from what he calls “phaenomena.”

The noumenon certainly qualifies as exempt from Kant’s definition of phenomenon. Consider this definition of a noumenon. “If by noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of it, then this is a noumenon in the negative sense. But if we understand by that an object a non-sensible intuition, then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be noumenon in a positive sense.” Noumena are objects, but not of our sensible intuition. Kant further subdivides noumena into positive and negative. Positive noumena are those which ostensibly have an intuition but one that is not of our knowing. This object, Kant says, is unrecognizable by us. Negative noumena on the other hand are mere abstractions; thought—objects with no intuition. It is the negative noumena that Kant chiefly refers to throughout the section entitled “On the Ground of the Distinction . . .” in the “Analytic of Principles” and in other sections.

Noumena are pure concepts of the understanding. They do not admit of experience. As with the transcendental object, there is no intuition in their constitution. The noumenon is but an idea of an object behind experience; it is not, however, an object of experience, as an object of the understanding only. This revised notion of noumena begins midway through the section on “The Ground of the Distinction . . .” of the ‘B’ Edition. Here, Kant argues, the noumenon is crucial because it necessary for the understanding to “represent itself as being able to make concepts of such an object . . .” Kant says further on that the noumenon in the negative sense is the object that remains after intuition is extracted from it; i.e. the form of thinking. And what is this form of thinking? It is “. . . the way of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition.” Though this looks suspiciously like the transcendental object of the ‘A’ edition, the noumenon is not a concept of objects in general, an objective state of all unity. This task has been overtaken in the B edition by the so-called Transcendental Unity of Apperception (self-consciousness). Rather, Kant portrays the noumenon as a concept of a singular entity with the express purpose of allowing for the empirical object to be represented in a manifold of intuition. Kant attempts a separation of these two concepts, but I suspect that in terms of their function, they appear to be closer than he wishes.
Toward the end of the “Ground of the Distinction . . .” section the noumenon is made to function merely as a boundary concept and no longer as a thought-object. The noumenon prevents sensibility from declaring that it is the only possible intuition. The concept of the noumenon thus inhibits the extension of sensibility to purported things in themselves by insisting that sensibility not reach beyond its own and lay claim to things as they might seem to be outside of it. “In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e., we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside of the field of sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding could be employed assertorically. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use.” Kant views the concept of the noumenon as providing the sensibility with a relation to the understanding that merely satisfies sensibility’s longing for extension, but connotes nothing positive of itself in this relationship. What, then, is Kant’s idea of the distinction, if there is any, between noumena and the thing-in-itself? Kant makes the claim that there is no distinction; they are coeval.

The thing in itself is a being of pure understanding; it is a concept of an object, one that lays outside intuition (as with the transcendental object) and that relates to the empirical object only in thought. Again, at this late stage of Kant’s developing concept of the noumenon, it is a thing in itself only in the negative sense. It limits the pretensions of sensibility to declare that its intuition is the only possible intuition and thereby prevents intuition from laying a claim to knowledge of things in themselves. It offers no causal connection between itself and an object of experience. If we accept that this late estimation of the noumena as a boundary concept is Kant’s final statement on the subject then Dewey’s argument that Kant finds it necessary to reach for an “unknown thing in itself” to explain away experience is, at the very least, problematic. Hegel and Dewey’s claim is that Kant reaches for something transcendental to ground experience and thereby renders a gulf between the real and ideal worlds. This claim is perhaps best expressed in Kant’s early turn to the notion of positive noumena, what he describes as the transcendental object. But this claim is thwarted by Kant’s later insistence that the noumena can only be a limiting concept to undercut the pretensions of sensibility (and leaving room for faith, as it were) and not an intelligible intuition.

What does all of this suggest for self-consciousness? It suggests that what is unified is not an intelligible intuition. It is a sensible intuition—that is, space and time. The ‘ingredients’ of the unity of apperception—the manifold of space and time—are unified by being brought under a rule (categories). To bring a manifold under a rule is to unify that manifold. It is to make that manifold (which in any event is already subject to the laws of
space and time) subject to our laws of understanding. The transcendental unity of apperception—the ‘I think’ that accompanies all representations is the condition for the unification of all manifolds—present and past. For the ‘I think’ takes us back and forth in time, from prior experiences to present ones and it can do this because it is the very ground of succession. The very possibility of thinking the past is occasioned only by representing states to ourselves. To say that representations can be accompanied is therefore to say that we have ‘self-consciousness.’

Hegel and neo-Hegelian Influences on Dewey

Now Dewey’s critique of Kant is in many aspects similar to Hegel’s. In Hegel’s Logic, Kant’s categories of Understanding are said to be only “instinctively active.” Hegel claims, “At first, they enter consciousness separately and so are variable and mutually confusing; consequently they afford to mind only a fragmentary and uncertain actuality; the loftier business of logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth.” We see this in Hegel’s outline of the Logic: quality precedes quantity, and these two precede relation; relation precedes modality. The categories often turn back into and upon themselves as logic develops. This is in contrast to the seemingly ‘fixed’ categories of Kant, where quantity precedes quality but not through development: quantity has ontological primacy. For Hegel, judgments are not fixed, nor do the categories ‘follow’ or ‘mimic’ them: in fact, judgments follow the categories. Judgments themselves are in movement: a disjunctive judgment that for Kant is fixed and antinomial is for Hegel merely a one-sided relation—the genus of the subject: the other side, the species itself (for example) cannot be mutually opposed to itself on pain of self-negation.

Kant’s failure to adequately discern the notion leads him, Hegel claims, to posit the “I” (the unity of apperception) as a mere representation. It is a mere formalism, empty and devoid of content. Nothing further is left, according to Hegel, than the “transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is cognized only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of which, taken in its isolation, we can never have the least conception.” This bare formalism, a purely subjective unity, is free from empirical condition. Hegel criticizes Kant at just this point: by removing from the “I think” all determinateness, the “I think” requires a transcendental object for its completion. Rather than seeing that the notion itself contains subjectivity and objective determinateness within, Kant strips away objectivity from the “I think” and is forced to invent a transcendental object = x to complete itself. Hegel’s criticism is that, Kant . . . had generally in mind only the estate of the metaphysics of his time, which in the main adhered to these abstract, one-sided determinations wholly devoid of dialectic; the genuinely speculative ideas of older philosophers on the notion of spirit he neither heeded nor examined. In
his criticism then of those determinations . . . he holds fast to the “I” as it appears in self-consciousness, from which, however, since it is its essence—the thing-in-itself—that we are to cognize, everything empirical must be omitted; nothing then is left but this phenomenon of the ‘I think’ that accompanies every representation of which ‘I think’ we have not the slightest conception . . . ‘I think’ we have not the least conception of the ‘I’, or of anything whatever, not even of the Notion itself, so long as we do not really think, but stop short at the simple, fixed general representation [Vorstellung] and the name . . . 39

Hegel indicts Kant’s self-consciousness for excessive formalism; a formalism that restricts empirical content (sensations, perceptions, empirical cognitions). Without these, we can have no conception of the “I.” Hegel continues,

But surely it is ridiculous to call this nature of self-consciousness, namely, that the ‘I’ thinks itself, that the ‘I’ cannot be thought without its being the ‘I’ that thinks, an inconvenience and, as though there was a fallacy in it, a circle. It is the absolute, eternal nature of self-consciousness and the Notion itself manifests itself, and manifests for this reason, that self-consciousness is just the existent pure Notion, and therefore empirically perceptible, the absolute relation-to-self that, as a separating judgment, makes itself its own object and is solely this process whereby it makes itself a circle.40

Absolute self-consciousness, as Hegel notes, already contains its empirical content. There is no dualism between subject and object; self-consciousness and phenomena, on this reading, judgments that take place occur within the Notion—that is to say, within self-consciousness. Self-consciousness does not need to rely on an unknown thing-in-itself on this reading because it is already properly its own ground and consequence.

Dewey agrees in the main with this, though he would eventually cast away the “Hegelian Garb” as it were, in favor of a naturalistic and experimentalist account of interaction and self-development. As Shook ably demonstrates, Dewey also charges Kant with creating a bare and excessively formal “I.” Notably, Dewey takes this movement in Hegel as the transformation of the merely logical to the psychological—a higher state of unity in the self, represented to itself in and through, self-consciousness. Now Kant, as Dewey argues and Shook notes, is unable to anticipate this move because of his conception of self as the activity of the combination of the categories with their sense-material (the so-called Transcendental Unity of Apperception) was simply too weak. It is said to rest merely upon logical forms and not a higher psychological and self-conscious unity of the organism. Consequently, it is unable to pull together in a unifying fashion the pure concepts with their phenomena. Unable to unify the experience of concept with object, Dewey argues that Kant is forced to adopt the idea of an unknown thing-in-itself to lay behind an experience and provide metaphys-
ical and transcendental justification for cognition. But the important consideration here is that this central criticism of Kant is first made by Hegel and is a criticism developed in Hegel’s Logic.

Of course, Dewey does not overtly rely on Hegel’s Logic to make his criticisms of Kant. As Shook demonstrates, he has much help, in the guise of three idealistic philosophers that have profound influence on Dewey’s early neo-Hegelian thinking. Dewey’s Hegelianism is sifted through the neo-Hegelians extant at the end of the 19th century—particularly G.S. Morris and Edward Caird. Caird, notably, is critical—among other things—of Kant’s “effort to free it [the transcendental deduction of the pure Categories of the Understanding] from psychology,” and in particular, the separation of the organic (empirical content) from the inorganic (transcendental object).41 Caird, in a lengthy passage, details the effects of this separation. I quote from the relevant passages:

The simplest statement that can be given of Kant’s procedure in the Deduction is that, while he masks the idea of an organic unity of the intelligence under the form of a reciprocity of action and reaction of its different faculties, he is obliged to bring in the unity of these elements as a kind of *deus ex machina* to supply a link between them. Thus he starts with a thing in itself, which affects the subject, and so produces a series of changes in its sensibility. As against this differentiation introduced into it from without, Kant conceives the self, in virtue of its unity, as showing a kind of self-defensive power of synthesis, by which it takes up and combines the impressions into one image, and then becomes conscious of its own activity, in so combining them. . . In other words, Kant thinks of the return of the subject to itself, whereby it becomes self-conscious, as the result of the process whereby it unites the manifold into one consciousness of objects. . . In other words, the dualism of a noumenal subject and object out of our knowledge is made necessary for Kant by the imperfection of the unity of the phenomenal subject and object in knowledge, which again, as a conscious imperfection, implies that knowledge does not correspond to its idea. . .42

Kant’s transcendental deduction both relies on and creates a dualism of subject and object here: Caird claims, for knowledge to occur, a dualism must be bridged.

[i]t appears, then, that the subject reacting on the manifold, which is forced on it from without, according to peculiar forms that belong to its peculiar sensitive constitution, synthetically combines that manifold; and that in opposition, though in relation, to the objects so determined it becomes conscious of its own self-identity. But this return upon its own pure identity, upon the “I am I” of pure self-consciousness is, in Kant’s view, a negative return, i.e., it is the recovery of the bare identity of self out of the foreign element in which it has become involved through its connexion with a sensibility. . . [Thus] the dualism of the subjective thing
Caird’s criticism is quite clear: Kant’s dualism of category and (empirical) object leads to a self-consciousness is merely a formal unity of apprehension. Two results are notable: the first is that the “I” cannot handle the job of unifying empirical knowledge. The second is that an unknown, a thing-in-itself, must be postulated of the subject to provide the metaphysical ground of the transcendental deduction. This argument clearly parallels Hegel’s reading of Kant in the Logic.

Morris, who also writes a systematic treatise on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, is somewhat less critical of Kant than Caird, but nevertheless in the main agrees that Kant’s attempt to separate the material from the spiritual is a failure. Commenting on Kant’s distinguishing of empirical content from the Thing-in-Itself, Morris concludes:

Here, as elsewhere in Kant’s work, we may observe the transitional, and hence mixed, character of his thought. And here, as elsewhere, our method will require us to distinguish between that in Kant which is matter only of dogmatic presupposition, and that which logically flows from the positive results of Kant’s inquiries. The outcome will be but a repetition of that lesson of Kant which has already been before us—the lesson of the untenableness of all ontological theories, which are colored by materialism, and of the truth of philosophy’s universal doctrine concerning the exclusive primacy of spirit in the world of absolute reality.

For Morris, there can be no separation of objects into noumenal and phenomenal because noumena are not objects. Morris thinks that Kant commits to the view of noumena as objects or worlds of objects, and chas- tises him for this. To commit to this, says Morris, is to materialize the unmaterializable; to convert noumena into empirical entities. Morris puts it this way in a lengthy passage.

But noumena and phenomena do not constitute for philosophy [against Kant] two separate and distinct “worlds” of objects or things. No such duplicity of worlds is found in conscious experience, of which alone philosophy is the interpretation. To suppose the case to be otherwise, and to regard phenomena as one set of objects for knowledge, and noumena as another wholly different set of objects, mechanically independent of phenomena, were simply to assimilate noumena to phenomena, or, rather, to the things-in-themselves of mechanical sensationalism . . . No, philosophy does not distinguish noumena and phenomena as two separate worlds, but as noting different aspects of the one universe of being in which man is consciously placed. Of the aspects, the one—the intelligible aspect, the so-called “world of noumena,”—is found to be fundamental and determin- ing, the other—the sensible aspect or “world of phenomena”—derivative.
and dependent. The two are organically one. The sensible world is the
manifestation of the intelligible world . . . The intelligible world is the key
to the philosophic comprehension of the sensible world.45

The subjective unity that is self-consciousness, the “I,” is too weak to do the
job of uniting empirical content. Kant is therefore forced to posit a thing-in-itself to provide the transcendental ground for this activity. The result is
a “two worlds” metaphysics—one sensible, material, and phenomenal; the
other rational, noumenal, and transcendental. And again, these are Hegel’s
specific criticisms as found in the Logic.

Dewey’s Early Critique of Kant

Let us turn to Dewey. In what is perhaps the only surviving link to the
dissertation Dewey writes while at Johns Hopkins is an early article first
published in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy that contains what becomes
Dewey’s chief and ongoing complaint against Kant and Kantianism.46 This
is “Kant and Philosophic Method.” Here, Dewey argues, “Though the cat-
egories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to which they
bear a purely external relation. They constitute objects, but these objects are
not such in universal reference, but only to beings of like capacities of recep-
tivity as ourselves. They respect not existence in itself, but ourselves as affected
by that existence.”47 Further, Dewey states “On the one side, he [Kant] had
learned that pure thought is analytic; on the other, that the individual is
affected with sensations impressed upon it by external objects. At the same
time that he corrects both of these doctrines with his own deduction of the
categories, he formally retains both errors.”48 Dewey’s chief criticisms here
are those mentioned above; that of subject (Reason, categories) and object
(sensation, material) as somehow in an external relation to each other. The
categories are said to be brought down to bear on the extraneous sensory
material and are themselves something outside of experience, with the expe-
rience itself only formed in the combination of categories and sense data.
The claim of the gulf between the ideal (categories) and real (phenomenon,
sensory material) is evident in one of the earliest articles Dewey writes.

This argument carries forward in much of Dewey’s later work. In “The
Present Position in Logical Theory,” Dewey argues “. . . [I]n Kant’s case, the
justification of the principle of causality by reference to the possibility of
experience means that thought must continually inject this principle into experience to keep
experience from disappearing; that experience must be constantly braced and rein-
forced by the synthetic action of thought or it will collapse. In short, the need
of experience for this principle of causation means its need for a certain sup-
port outside itself.”49 The stage is set for the second of Dewey’s major com-
plaints against Kant; the turn to noumena to bridge the gap between the ideal
and the real. Dewey expands his arguments somewhat in the short time
between his very first article on Kant and his “Psychology and Philosophic
Method” of 1886. Not only is the supposed separation between the ideal and
real again lamented, but further criticism of Kant’s purported solution to the problem of how we, as conscious beings, can ever hope to bridge the gulf, commences. Specifically, Dewey criticizes more fully Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself. Dewey believes that the positing of this noumenon is merely a logical move to justify bridging the gap between ideal and real and serves to artificially buttress a manifestly weak notion of self; a self that because it cannot be logically demonstrated, is incapable of the unity required to bridge the two realms. As such, it denies a realm Dewey thinks crucial to the argument of how best to go about bringing mind and world together: absolute self-consciousness. Kant denigrates experience through the introduction of an unknown thing-in-itself, which lies outside of experience, whereas Dewey (and Hegel) characteristically places all logical moves inside of experience. Experience occurs not through the bringing of a realm outside of experience together with one inside, but rather in and through the awareness of self-consciousness as it sees itself in the interconnection between self and world. The manner in which experience is manifest is not exclusively through logic; rather, through psychology, which for Dewey, is the self’s own formal self-awareness. Indeed, self-consciousness is exhausted by experience in Dewey’s neo-Hegelian reading of the matter. In opposition to Kant, psychology does not transcend space and time. Dewey argues in this essay that:

What the denial [of experience as psychological, as opposed to merely logical] comes to we have had historically demonstrated in Kant. He admits perception and conception as matters of experience, but he draws the line at self-consciousness. It is worth noticing that his reason for denying it is not psychological at all, but logical. It is not because self-consciousness is not a fact, but because it cannot be a fact according to his logical presuppositions. The results following the denial are worthy of notice as corresponding exactly to what we might be lead to expect: first, with the denial of the fact of self-consciousness comes the impossibility of solving the problem of philosophy, expressed in the setting up of an unknown thing-in-itself as the ultimate ground and condition of experience; and, secondly, comes the failure to bring perception and conception into any organic experience, that is the failure to really comprehend and explain them, manifested in the limitation of both perception, through the forms of space and time, and thinking, through the categories, to phenomena which are in no demonstrable connection with [external] reality.50

These arguments of Dewey’s against Kant are the same arguments, differently presented perhaps, of Morris and Caird, and originally, of Hegel, in the Logic. The weakness and inability of self-consciousness to unify empirical content; the resultant turn to an unknown thing-in-itself; the creation of a dualism that cannot be bridged—all of these are first suggested by Hegel and fully developed in the Logic.

In 1890, Dewey wrote another essay critical of Kantianism. This essay is directed at Andrew Seth, who writes a text entitled Hegelianism and Per-
sonality. That text aims to show that the prevailing neo-idealism of Green, Caird, and Bradley fails and Seth dismisses this through a reconstruction of both Kant and Hegel.\(^5\) Dewey takes Seth to task for his “reconstruction.” Many of the arguments in the essay are in concert with Dewey’s earlier thinking on the subject. Nevertheless, Dewey has a more nuanced anti-Kantianism here. He is able to think through to the possibility of Kantianism without the noumenon. This is an argument that is not present in the work of the other neo-Hegelians extant. Characteristically enough, he pronounces this Kantianism as equally unworkable, owing chiefly to several supposed weaknesses of Kant’s own expressions of self-consciousness; in particular, the supposed inability to narrow the gap created between self and experience and to escape its own constructions of space and time. “There thus remains a distinction between self and experience, due not now to the shadow thrown on knowledge by the thing-in-itself, but by the incompatibility of sensation, as rendered a manifold of external particulars in space and time, to the unconditioned content of self-consciousness.”\(^5\) For Kant, “Experience can never be complete enough to have a content equal to that of self-consciousness, for experience can never escape its limitation through space and time. Self-consciousness is real, and not merely logical experience, and yet is unknown except so far as it is reflected through its own determinations in experience,—this is the result of our analysis of Kant, the Ding-an-sich, being eliminated but the Kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of the Ding-an-sich being retained.”\(^5\)

Kant’s self is real, not ideal or merely a “supreme category of explanation.”\(^5\) The false conclusion that Kant’s self is merely ideal arises only if one reads Kant through Hegel’s Logic and concludes that his project was to map out “the entire meaning of thought.”\(^5\) Kant’s project is rather “the examination of knowledge; and his method is not a consideration of the significance, placing, relative adequacy and inadequacy of the conceptions or aspects of thought with a view to discovering the entire meaning of thought; his method is an analysis of the actual factors which actually constitute knowledge.”\(^5\) If this is so, then the world of self-consciousness cannot exhaust the world of experience because the world of experience is dependent upon sensation. But this leads to a further problem in attempting to shear Kant’s thing-in-itself from the self.

As long as sensation was regarded as given by a thing-in-itself [affecting us], it was possible to form a conception of the self which did not identify it with the world. But when sense is regarded as having meaning only because it is “there” as determined by thought, just as thought is “there” only as determining sense, it would seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity (thus equaling the world) or that it must be thrust back of experience, and become a thing-in-itself. The activity of the self can hardly be a third something distinct from thought and from sense, and it can not be their synthetic union.”\(^5\)
If the former is followed, we are thrown back upon the thing-in-itself. This is the way of the (orthodox) Kantian. If we follow the latter, the way of Kant without the thing-in-itself, then the self cannot be recognized as distinct from the fusion of thought and sense, and neither of these seems workable.\textsuperscript{58}

Dewey draws a similar conclusion to the one that he drew in “The Present Position in Logical Theory,” despite his thought experiment with a Kantianism shorn of the noumenon. Self-consciousness in Kant is divorced from, and parasitic upon, the very experience Kant characteristically believed all possible self-consciousness rests, and this cannot be repaired, even if the noumenon is excised. The conclusion, though nevertheless in keeping with neo-Hegelianism, is not present in Morris or Caird. It is, however, in Hegel’s \textit{Logic}, though Dewey does not seem to note this. I quote the relevant text here.

The victory of the Kantian criticism over the [rationalist] metaphysics consists . . . in doing away with the investigation that has truth for its aim, and this aim itself; it omits altogether to raise the one question of interest, whether a particular subject, here the abstract ‘I’ of ordinary thinking possesses truth in and for itself . . . As a matter of fact, the Notion does reach beyond the Notion-less, and the immediate justification for going beyond it is first, the Notion itself, and secondly, from the negative side, the untruth of phenomena and of ordinary thinking, as well as of abstractions like things-in-themselves and the above ‘I,’ that is supposed not to be an object to itself.\textsuperscript{59}

Hegel’s contention is that Kant cannot account in his metaphysics of Reason for the truth because Kant’s metaphysics of Reason limits itself to empirical cognition, whereas Hegel’s notion is able to see itself as the truth that it is. That is, the only truth that it requires is its own, on the one side, and on the other, the ‘untruth,’ as Hegel puts it, of phenomena and cognition without the Notion. Consequently, and this is germane to Dewey’s claims, it is able to overcome the need for abstractions such as the thing-in-itself. Hegel’s argument is very similar to Dewey’s; both claim that there is no need to postulate such an unknown because the Notion (and in Dewey’s later language, experience) already supplies the possibility of this and this through the unity of world and thought. Dewey claims that reading Kant through Hegel’s \textit{Logic} misleads the interpreter into collapsing the projects of the two together and he is correct; but in fact, Dewey forgets that Hegel’s project \textit{here} is not simply to map out thought but to show that thought and experience are always already folded into one another, even for the purposes of logic, and the proof of this is in Hegel’s insistence that \textit{Phenomenology of the Spirit}, which \textit{does} trace the development of cognition through its experience, supplies the ‘ladder’ for the \textit{Logic}.

Dewey’s implication in all of this is that Kant somehow \textit{wants} the understanding to form, to create, its own knowledge (either in the manner of...
intuition-less concepts or, what amounts to much the same thing, through access to intelligible intuitions). However, the perceptual material of the sensible intuition inhibits him (recall the argument at the very end of the quoted passage of the Logic). As cognition can only be of perceptual material, Kant is forced to find another avenue for the creation of the noumenal realm and the thing in itself. The thing in itself allows Kant the opportunity for an object that has no allegiance to, nor is required to obey, the laws constraining objects of experience. Because of this, Dewey charges Kant with having rationalistic tendencies. By the mid-1890’s, Dewey abandons absolute idealism (though not idealism tout court), and he thereafter scoffs at attempts at trying to idealize experience through the unity of something called self-consciousness. Nevertheless, these criticisms remain. These criticisms—of the weakness and formality of Kant’s self-consciousness; of the need of Kant for an unknown thing-in-itself; and for the resultant dualism between mind and world, are first formulated by Hegel, carried on by the British neo-Hegelians and G.S. Morris, and ultimately find their way into Dewey’s thinking.

The Middle Years
Thus far I have discussed central arguments Dewey levels against Kant in his earliest works. Here I turn to a middle work of Dewey’s— one that to judge by the scholarship, is less-well thought of than most of his works. But this short book— German Philosophy and Politics, is Dewey’s most extensive treatment of German idealism generally, and Kant specifically. Dewey never again engages in Kant exegesis to this degree. In this paper, I discuss at length the forces and thinking behind Dewey’s criticisms of Kant. Here I wish to develop Dewey’s sustained critical arguments of Kant and point out the affinity of these to his earlier arguments in the earliest works. I shall show that the early claims—that Kant maintains a dualism between mind and world; that Kant’s categories are fixed and final; that Kant erects an unknown thing-in-itself to ground empirical cognition, and that Kant’s conception of the self is ultimately barren. All of these arguments Dewey presses into service for his ultimate claim. This is that the German state is an indirect product of Kant’s separation of morality from nature.

Recently, Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society featured an article of James Campbell’s discussing Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics. Central to the article is the discussion of Kant and the way in which Dewey describes his contribution to World War I. Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics implicates the ideas of the German philosophers Kant, Fichte, and Hegel in the genesis of the Great War. Historically, this book is poorly received. No less an ardent Dewey supporter than Sydney Hook, criticizes the arguments of this text. In his introduction to Volume 8 of Dewey’s collected middle works, Hook says; “It fails to show how and why this Kantian dualism between the world of nature and the world of morals should have led to a campaign of imperialistic aggression coupled with asseverations about the majesty of the moral law.
as interpreted by spokesmen for the Hohenzollern dynasty.” Though Dewey has been roundly criticized for his linkage of 18th and 19th century German Idealism to the rhetoric of the Great War in Germany, Campbell raises the question of whether there is not something in Dewey’s account that rings true. Specifically, Campbell wonders if Dewey’s “reading of Kant’s understanding of duty as justifying obedience to the dictates of a militaristic government . . .” is beneficial. For, “there were prominent political figures in Germany—like General Friedrich von Bernhardi—and prominent German intellectual figures in America-like the philosopher/psychologist Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard, who couched their support for the actions of the Central Powers in a similar account of Kant.” Dewey is certainly not without context in his condemnation of the spirit of German philosophy. Nor is he alone in his connection of the historical self-understanding of Germany with its subsequent militaristic developments. Though Campbell is unable to marshal specific evidence that Münsterberg is directly in Dewey’s thoughts at the time of writing this book, he does an able job of demonstrating Münsterberg’s enthusiasm for the German spirit. I do not wish to tread ground covered by Campbell. I only maintain, with Campbell, that there were philosophical forces extant in support of the German spirit—forces that, in Münsterberg’s case, argued for American neutrality in the European conflict. Campbell concludes that, though “Dewey does not offer here the most philosophically valuable interpretation of Kant and the idealistic tradition . . . he still might be offering a historically accurate picture of how Kant and idealism were then functioning in German thinking.” Campbell does not provide a detailed rebuttal of the charges Dewey lays at the doorstep of German Idealism and Immanuel Kant. Nor does he connect Dewey’s vast statements on Kant to his statements in German Philosophy and Politics. Each of these seems an intriguing enough task to complete. Here I shall engage the latter task.

Some scholars have famously criticized German politics while disagreeing with Dewey on the value of the German spirit. William Ernest Hocking is perhaps the most famous of these. For Hocking, Dewey’s argument falls apart because he cannot convincingly tie Kant to the extant German political scene. German politics is realpolitik—Bismarck’s politics, not Kant’s. Realpolitik is framed in opposition to German Idealism, particularly that of Kant. In his own way, Dewey’s soon-to-be most famous antagonist of the time, Randolph Bourne, makes a similar claim. Though Bourne sees the need for developing a specifically American spirit, he does not think wholesale repudiation of German idealism is a worthwhile enterprise. Indeed, he develops an argument against Dewey, primarily through his appropriation of Nietzsche, to criticize pragmatism’s scientism and optimism. This is most evident in Bourne’s 1917 work, Twilight of the Idols. Dewey was almost alone among intellectuals in condemning tout court, both German politics and German idealism. Dewey thinks he recognizes German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries as complicit in the evil of the Great War. To make his argument, Dewey has to demonstrate that earlier German
philosophy, particularly of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, is responsible for the nationalism, statism, and absolutism that merge to form the intellectual, social and cultural nucleus of the Great War. Dewey’s biographers, Alan Ryan and Robert Westbrook, as well as Sydney Hook and James Campbell, agree that Dewey’s estimation of German philosophy’s involvement in the Great War runs deeper than a mere historical connection. They all see that it is important for Dewey to set his own philosophy of democratically inspired inquiry apart from the Germans. Particularly important for Dewey is the necessity of exploiting the supposed logical ends of absolutism and idealism as he sees it preached in the great German systems of the early 19th century. These ends are the amalgamation of absolutism, nationalism, and the state that supposedly coalesces to form an explicit racial and cultural superiority. Dewey’s radically democratic inquiry is the antithesis of absolutistic inquiry. It neither endorses nor is the product of an absolutistic philosophic framework. Neither is it the product of a national “spirit” or state. Rather it reinforces its own legitimacy and holds its own authority. It is to be, as Dewey often remarks, wholly experimental. “For the philosophy stands or falls with the conception of an absolute. Whether a philosophy of absolutes is theoretically sound or unsound may be practically as dangerous as matter of fact political absolutism history testifies. The situation puts in relief what finally is at issue between a theory which is pinned to a belief in an Absolute beyond history and behind experience, and one which is frankly experimental. For any philosophy that is not consistently experimental will always traffic in absolutes no matter in how disguised a form. In German political philosophy, the traffic is without mask.”

Dewey begins his argument against the philosophers by stressing that “pure” thought isolated from the activities of peoples, does not exist.

I do not believe, then, that pure ideas, or pure thought, ever exercised any influence upon human action. I believe that very much of what has been presented as philosophic reflection is in effect simply an idealization, for the sake of emotional satisfaction, of the brutally given state of affairs, and is not a genuine discovery of the practical influence of ideas ... But I also believe that there are no such things as pure ideas or pure reason. Every living thought represents a gesture made toward the world, an attitude taken to some practical situation in which we are implicated. Most of these gestures are ephemeral; they reveal the state of him who makes them rather than effect a significant alteration of conditions. But at some times they are congenial to a situation in which men in masses are acting and suffering. They supply a model for the attitudes of others; they condense into a dramatic type of action.

For Dewey, any thinking is always colored by time and by place. In addition, any absolutistic philosophy that attempts to shore itself off from the culture of which it is a product is an attempt to reify existing social tendencies and arrangements. Germany is Dewey’s chief and greatest example of this
tendency. Existing political and educational institutions, Dewey argues, are tailor-made to take the a priori, universal, and necessary philosophy of Germany as an apology for instituting an absolutistic, nationalistic state.74

Immanuel Kant gives birth to this statism and nationalism. Although Dewey admits that he cannot directly implicate Kant in the coming-to-be of these tendencies, Kant nevertheless is the one who ushers in an a priori, absolutistic, and necessary philosophy that later gives credence to an absolutistic, a priori and necessary, state. In particular, it is Kant’s “dual system of legislation” that comes under attack by Dewey.

For I cannot avoid the effort to seize from out of his highly technical writings a single idea and to label that his germinal idea . . . Adventuring without further preface into this field, I find that Kant’s decisive contribution is the idea of a dual legislation of reason by which are marked off two distinct realms—that of science and that of morals. Each of these two realms has its own final and authoritative constitution; On one hand, there is the world of sense, the world of phenomena in space and time in which science is at home; on the other hand, is the supersensible, the noumenal world, the world of moral duty and moral freedom.75

Dewey argues that for Kant, the inner, moral realm has primacy over the outer, physical one.76 This, argues Dewey, sets the stage for later developments within philosophy; developments that transform the inner, moral realm into an arm of the state. The state is the final transformation of Kant’s inner moral realm. It is the transformation of inner law to outer might.77 The transformation takes place through a Romantic philosophy that conceives of Kant’s inner moral life and the duty thereby proscribed to an outer moral life as reversible. The shift from inner to outer situated the locus of authority not in inner duty, rather outer law. In so doing, the State emerges as that organ responsible for control of morality.

The state, crafted as the superior moral and legislative force of man, ushers the gradual realization of the state as a divine idea. The Germanic state—the highest embodiment of spirit according to Hegel—is poised to provide for itself the philosophical legitimation for force against other, less spiritually embodied nations. More recently, warmongers, in dealing with Germany’s interlocutors, invoke the absolutistic foundations upon which German diplomacy rests. This is the idea of a divine nation-state. The result is an estimation of Germany as superior by universalistic and absolutistic standards; in effect, licensing the German nation-state to take whatever measures it desires in matters of foreign affairs, including war. To evaluate properly Dewey’s argument against Kant requires a more detailed examination and analysis of Dewey’s text. I turn now to such an analysis by examining and commenting upon three arguments that Dewey puts forth. The first of these is that Kant forces a separation of nature and morals. The second is that this separation necessitates an “empty” morality legislated only by bare duty. The third is that subsequent philosophers, most notably Fichte
and Hegel, “fill” the void created from the debris left by the collapse of Kant’s grand edifice with an absolutistic and nationalistic state. It is this state, Dewey argues, that pronounces itself superior to others and legitimizes the use of force that impels the Great War.

The Separation of Nature and Morals

Dewey argues that the separation of nature from morals is the root cause of the movement that leads to Germany’s involvement in the Great War. What remains is to make Dewey’s argument more clear. What does the separation of nature from morals entail? And what consequences ensue from this separation? Dewey argues that separation entails subordination of the natural realm to the moral realm such that, “Freedom of soul and subordination of action dwell in harmony. Obedience, definite subjection and control, detailed organization is the lesson enforced by the rule of causal necessity in the outer world of space and time in which action takes place . . . [as opposed to] Unlimited freedom, the heightening of consciousness for its own sake, sheer reveling in noble ideals, the law of the inner world.”

The outer realm of space and time is the realm of action. The inner realm of morals is one of contemplation and duty. Both realms submit to reason. Nevertheless, as Dewey argues, the outer realm of nature, in submitting to a priori categories, “pigeon-holes” nature. These force nature into a rigid and inflexible mode that denies modification by experience. In this way reason “controls” nature, bending and molding it for its purposes. Equally, the laws of nature—of space and time—cannot “intrude” on the law of morals. However, the relationship is not symmetrical; the law of morals has jurisdiction over man’s actions, while the law of nature does not have jurisdiction over morals. Dewey quotes as evidence of this the following passage from Kant:

Even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that it is not possible to go from the first to the second (at least by means of the theoretical use of reason) any more than if they were two separate worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the second—yet the second is meant to have an influence upon the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its law . . .

While nature pursues its own laws irrespective of morals, the realm of morals nevertheless has designs on it. The laws of nature—the categories—issue forth from the Understanding yet function only in the realm of experience, of space and time. The laws of morality, however, command both morals and nature. Inasmuch as men’s actions are beholden to duty, morals intrude upon nature and duty upon sense.

There are essentially two charges here, and both relate to the separation of nature from morals. The first is that the a priori categories involved in the
fashioning of nature are rigid and inflexible and thereby lend themselves to a view of nature as hierarchically ordered. The second is that the impingement of morals upon nature leads to nature subordinated through and by a higher and more austere realm of obedience and duty. Dewey argues that both serve to abrogate nature: the realm of experience in politics, of evidentiary conclusions based upon the needs of the people in a particular time and place; in short, of a democratic politic, is self-consciously undermined. It seems that what Dewey is claiming is that because moral laws do not develop out of the natural contexts (of which, for Dewey, they are a part and to which they are beholden) they cannot do the job of guiding moral conduct. Dewey seems to think that Kant’s moral laws are ready-made to be pressed into service in the conduct of human affairs. He does not discuss Kant’s discussion of subjective maxim-formation, or the claims of Kant that morally worthy actions are those done in accordance with the common consent of all. Consequently, he is unable to see how Kant might bridge the supposed gap between moral law and human conduct.

Note the congruence of Dewey’s claims in German Philosophy and Politics thus far to his earlier claims. Kant maintains an inseparable gulf between the moral and natural worlds. It is the very fact of this gulf that allows Kant to posit the moral world as the higher one. It seems odd to charge Kant with separating the moral and natural worlds and at once, pronouncing the moral as the higher one. To do this is to re-connect the worlds. Dewey doesn’t pause to tell us how Kant’s worlds can at once be separate and yet connected. But Kant’s supposed two worlds thesis, of moral (noumenal) and natural (phenomenal) is a criticism that comes straight from Dewey’s earliest works, particularly Dewey’s first sustained criticism of Kant, “Kant and Philosophic Method.” And as we recall, it was Hegel and the neo-Hegelians that supplied the force of the criticism that Dewey would then re-fashion for his own philosophical account of method.

Kant’s Empty Morality

I turn now to the second argument of Dewey’s. In critiquing Kant’s concept of morals, Dewey states that the moral law is to be sure a “supreme law of action” but nevertheless is also said to be “silent as to what men’s duties specifically are.” Duty is a manifestation of inner sense. But this, according to Dewey, is not enough to guide men in their actions. Clearly, there has to be some outer, external compliment to inner duty. Dewey argues that Kant finds this compliment in the State. “The sense of duty must get its subject-matter somewhere, and unless subjectivism was to revert to anarchic or romantic individualism (which is hardly in the spirit of obedience to authoritative law) its appropriate subject-matter lies in the commands of a superior. Concretely what the State commands is the congenial outer filling of a purely inner sense of duty.” Despite alluding to Kant’s cosmopolitanism and his trust and hope in a federation of states, Dewey castigates Kant for undergirding his moral theory with a bare and formal conception
of duty. This, Dewey argues, is coterminous with allowing existing social authorities to clothe duty with a strong, authoritarian, absolutistic notion of the state. Empty, inner duty, far from being immune to empirical, experiential, and social concerns, has a partner in the guise of the state. The state commands in outer life what duty commands in inner life. As duty is absolutistic, transcendental, and pure, so the state becomes as well. The only hedge against the oppressive notion of an absolutistic and transcendental state, Dewey argues, is to frame a notion of morality not on pure reason, rather on the consequences of the actions of people. Intelligence is manifest in the working-out of the consequences of peoples’ actions, and not the deduction of a pure realm of duty. As Dewey argues, “A gospel of duty separated from empirical purposes and results tends to gag intelligence. It substitutes for the work of reason displayed in a wide and distributed survey of consequences in order to determine where duty lies in an inner consciousness, empty of content, which clothes the form of rationality in the demands of existing social authorities. A consciousness which is not based upon and checked by consideration of actual results upon human welfare is nonetheless socially irresponsible because labeled reason.”

Dewey’s argument appears to derive its support from the “emptiness” factor in Kant’s conception of duty. By arguing that Kant conceives of a duty that is empty and formal, Dewey (like Hegel before him) seems to content himself that this is enough to draw the conclusion that a strong, authoritarian state could arise in its midst, with duty having little to nothing to say about it, and perhaps even to lend it support. Here again we have Dewey developing his argument on the basis of prior claims first broached in his earlier works. The gulf between duty and social action renders duty bare and formal. It does not have the wherewithal to lead people in their social activities. Like the bare self, it is powerless. These are arguments that have their genesis in Dewey’s earlier claims against Kant’s formal “I” and the separation Kant proclaims, of the “I” and the world.

The Filling of the Void

The “inseparable gulf” between nature and morals, together with a morality that is at once empty and formal, involved in the world yet somehow apart from it, paradoxically leads to the formation of a strong, absolutistic state in Germany. Kant’s “ambiguous moral position,” to use Dewey’s term, leaves the state in an indefensible position. Since the state has little or no moral authority, a theory of the state granting a strong authoritarian role fills the void. This role is to be the obverse to the role that Kant sets out for the state, inasmuch as this new role links the state to the realm of the absolute and divine.

Fichte provides the first pull away from the Kantian conception of the state as the embodiment of external right; the corollary to inner duty. Fichte’s ego-centered philosophy insists that individual personalities are the locus of the attainment of freedom and reason. It is not an innate faculty to be cultivated
through individual application; rather, it is a shared capacity; one that ameliorates through the intersubjectivity of individuals.\textsuperscript{90} The way to augment this capacity—the method of cultural transmission—becomes an educational concern. Educational activity combined with “complete regulation of the industrial activities of its members . . .”\textsuperscript{91} ensures that the moral freedom of individuals establishes itself. The transition from a realm of inner, intrasubjective moral freedom to outer, intersubjective moral freedom is in progress. Since the locus of freedom now resides in the intersubjective linkages that bring men together, it stands that the most organized and effective of all links must be the realm where freedom resides most strongly. For Fichte, this is the State. However, Fichte has not yet fully positioned the state in a metaphysical or religious context. That task Hegel achieves, by transitioning the state from merely the best mechanism for cultural and educational dissemination of freedom to the realm of the absolute and divine. It is in Hegel that we see the first systematic treatise of State as organ of divinity and of absoluteness.\textsuperscript{92}

Since the state is the absolute, metaphysical, and divine organ of freedom, it follows, argues Dewey that certain states merit greater status with respect to their achievement of freedom. More particularly, Hegel accords the German state with this status. This status, argued Dewey, thereby justifies the inculcation of a strong sense of nationalism in the German people. Hegel and Fichte’s philosophy of history, Dewey argues, does not simply provide metaphysical proofs for the existence of the superior state; it provides the machinery for the formation of a powerful German nationalism to evolve.\textsuperscript{93} This nationalism provides the means by which the seeds of the rhetoric of war are sown. “Philosophical justification of war follows inevitably from a philosophy of history composed in nationalistic terms. History is the movement, the march of God on earth through time. Only one nation in history is thus particularly manifest in those changes by which unique place passes from one nation to another. War is the signally visible occurrence of such a flight of the divine spirit in its onward movement.”\textsuperscript{94}

The Great War is the result of several interrelated historical and philosophical occasions. The first of these is the gulf left by Kant via the separation into worlds of nature and morals. The second is the filling in of this gulf via the expressivist philosophies of history provided by Fichte and Hegel. A strong state is erected in place of the characteristically weak one Kant provides. This leads to a conception of the state as absolutistic, nationalistic, and divine. This sets the stage for the further justification of war as the movement of the divine spirit of the state in its historical destiny. Dewey derives part of his argument regarding Kant’s role in the Great War from a dialectical play of opposites. As Kant’s gulf between nature and morals creates an empty morality, the gulf “fills” by others who move in a dialectically opposite direction; that of a strong state and a weak inner conviction in contrast to a weak state and a strong inner conviction.

Dewey argues that not only does the Kantian world fall to the Romantics, but that the debris of his ruined construction is used to fill the chasm
that links state to freedom— a more serious and profound charge than the rather simple one of Romantic philosophy exerting its state in dialectical antithesis to Kant.95 For it seems to make Kant more responsible for the then-upcoming nationalism than the fabrication of Kant’s responsibility for the Great War turning upon a mere reaction to his work. Dewey once again hinges his argument on the nature of Kant’s obedience to authority and the stiffness with which the categories of nature perform their duties. He also makes allusions to Kant as somehow condoning acts of War as part of the rights of nations. He does not utilize textual information in Kant for these arguments. Rather, he turns for evidence to a Prussian Calvary General, Friedrich Von Bernhardi, who utilizes quotations from the Critique of Pure Reason in support of his military tendencies.96 97 And as Hocking and Campbell maintain, Dewey’s appropriation of Bernhardi can be described as misleading at best.

Here I pause to consider Dewey’s folding of Hegel into his criticisms. Though Kant is largely to blame for setting the groundwork for the rise of German militaristic spirit, it is subsequent German idealists that actually complete this. Here we may be reminded that elsewhere Dewey calls Kant a ‘transitional philosopher.’ Clearly if he is this, and we are to believe Dewey’s rhetoric, the subsequent period following on Kant, the period of German Expressivism and Romanticism, looks nothing like the completion of this transition. The argument that Hegel completes what Kant begins in juxtaposition to Kant is a novel one. It does not have its genesis in Dewey’s early works. The irony, though palpable, is Hegel’s. Dewey’s criticism of Kant is largely Hegel’s, if we are to judge by corresponding statements in Hegel’s Logic. Dewey, after making what are Hegelian arguments against Kant, turns the results of these against Hegel. He folds German idealism back into itself. Though Dewey would remain an experimental idealist, as Shook rightly maintains, the possibility of extracting anything idealist beyond this seems moot from this point forward in Dewey’s intellectual career.

Conclusion
Dewey begins his philosophic career critical of Kant. His earliest articles, steeped in the neo-Hegelian idealism of Edward Caird and G.S. Morris, are evidence of profound dissent with the architecture of Kant’s first Critique and his moral theory. Later criticisms of Kant’s moral theory such as in German Philosophy and Politics repeat the common and basic theme of Dewey’s: that Kant separates the existential from the logical; the subjective from the objective; laws from sensations; and nature from morals: that Kant relies on an unknown thing-in-itself to ground empirical cognitions: and that Kant’s self is formal and bare. These early criticisms are repeated through Dewey’s intellectual career and have their basis in Hegel and subsequent neo-Hegelian thought. Hegel emerges as a closer intellectual inspiration to Dewey on a reading of his Logic. Dewey spends almost his entire career combating these dualisms with more or less success, depending upon the philosophic bent of the judge.
Here, I can only make suggestions regarding the success of Dewey’s critique of Kant. The first suggestion is that Dewey often (though not always, as is the case with the article “On Some Current Conceptions of the Term “Self””), distances himself too greatly from Kant—especially with regards to Kant’s insistence that mind and world are fused in an experience and that in this experience mind (concepts) and percepts (the qualities of an experience) run together. This is a huge departure from extant empiricist and rationalist thinking of the time, and Dewey does not pay sufficient homage to this. Second, Dewey (and Hegel, Morris, and Caird) misunderstands the function of the thing-in-itself. It is not to be construed as an unknown ‘something’ to ground empirical cognition. At least on one reading of Kant, it looks like a boundary concept, a limit condition that serves to curb the pretensions of Understanding. We may fairly dispute which of these readings of Kant the correct one is; but at least one of Kant’s two minds regarding this gets short shrift in the neo-Hegelian literature, and Dewey falls prey to this as well. Dewey also seems to think that the Moral Law is distanced from human conduct. He does not pause to consider the importance Kant places on the construction of subjective maxims of moral worth, or the importance of obtaining the common consent of all in forming these maxims. This oversight seems to get him into trouble with his argument over how Kant is to bridge the gap between moral law and human conduct—which Dewey, characteristically, claims is he unable to do. Kant’s chief weakness is in his dualisms: everywhere Dewey sees these, but he does not pay sufficient attention to Kant’s overcoming of these, either in Kant’s epistemological works (The Critique of Pure Reason) or his moral theory. This leads Dewey to force Kant and Hegel intellectually further apart than they actually were; a distance, incidentally, that Hegel himself helped to create in his attempts to get out from under the Critical Philosophy of Kant. A fuller accounting of Dewey’s successes and failures, together with the history of the distancing of Hegelians from Kantians, are required: however this is a project for another time and place.

REFERENCES


NOTES
2. This biographical data comes primarily from Westbrook’s John Dewey and American Democracy. I am also indebted to John Shook’s recent book, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of
Knowledge and Reality. Though Shook provides a fuller treatment of Dewey’s position vis a vis experience than I do here, his task is to make Dewey’s earlier works of a piece with his later thinking on the subject of knowledge, and not to detail Dewey’s relationship to Kant’s thought. I alone bear the responsibility for the subsequent discussion of Dewey’s critique of Kant and its analysis. For a fuller treatment of Dewey’s notion of experience in the period of his embracing of Hegelian idealism and the influence of G. S. Morris, see especially Shook’s second chapter, entitled “Absolute Idealism,” and the fourth chapter, entitled, “The Absolute of Active Experience.”

3. p. 49.
4. Ibid.
5. p. 154
6. Ibid. I find it interesting to say the least, that at the end of the 19th century, Kant is thought of as a realist. True, he does advocate for an empirical realism. But his transcendental idealism certainly overshadows this. Few, I believe, would consider Kant’s dualisms the product of a realist philosophy today.
10. pp. 137–138. Here, Shook credits Hegel with being a great influence on Dewey. Shook traces the problems Hegel has with Kant’s metaphysics of experience as Dewey recounts them. Shook notes that Dewey is careful to not call dynamic thought, ‘dialectic.’ Rather, he calls it ‘movement.’ Dewey rejects the Hegelian nomenclature for his naturalistically-inspired alternative. This is in keeping with Dewey’s other major influence-functionalist psychology. In fact, Dewey never trusted Hegel’s account of change.
13. Kant’s theory of morals, regardless of its shortcomings, pushes the debate regarding morality into the sphere of action and conduct. Though it was de rigueur at the time to consider Kant’s theory of morals as rigid and formalist, most Kant scholars nowadays see his discussion of the formation of subjective maxims as taking place in the context of a rich set of social rules and norms. In terms of morals, Shook claims that “A moral judgment is always a conclusion of what ought to be done in a particular situation in light of certain circumstances . . . [T]he moral judgment concerns the unfolding conduct of another person. The ideal also can be used in one’s analysis of one’s own unfolding conduct and similarly may provoke an alteration of conduct.” Though I cannot deal with this, I do suggest that the recent Kant scholarship pushes Kant closer to other German Idealists (and to Dewey) than otherwise.
20. Ibid., A 79.
21. Ibid, B 134–137
23. We must think this object, Kant claims. This is so because the Law, the principle of Practical Reason, is freedom. Freedom, God, and Immortality are necessary
though regulative concepts of Reason that we just must have if we are to orient ourselves in our world. Freedom—the capacity for Humankind to give a law to itself that is non-contradictory, is the possibility of Enlightenment.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, A 538.
29. Ibid, B 306.
30. Ibid, B 308.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, B 309.
34. Ibid, B 310.
35. Ibid, A 399.
40. Ibid, p. 777–778. I break with Miller’s use of ‘idea’ in place of Vorstellung, as this was the term Kant used frequently to denote representation, and I believe that Hegel is using it in the same sense as Kant, to maintain synonymy.
42. Ibid, p. 368–369.
46. The loss of Dewey’s dissertation is to be profoundly regretted. Nevertheless, this paper is very helpful in outlining Dewey’s criticisms of Kant.
47. Dewey, J. “Kant and Philosophic Method,” p. 39. Shook discusses this paper at length and I shall only gloss over the argument relevant to my purpose here.
51. By the time of this writing, Dewey had broken with these other idealist writers. Within a few short years he would do the same with Hegel. Shook, again, demonstrates well Dewey’s criticism of Seth (and T. H. Green) in his lengthy exegesis of this work.
53. Ibid, p. 68.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid, p. 73.
58. Dewey, “On Some Current Conceptions of the Term “Self,”” p. 73. A perceptive reviewer notes one possible solution Dewey appeals to here (though he sees it as occasioning further difficulty) is partly Kantian. The solution is the “[discovery] of a self acting through thought upon sensation. Thought as synthetic is acting upon sense,
and sense is through the synthetic action of thought” (72). This strongly suggests that Dewey attempts to carve out a middle path between Kant and Hegel. If this is right, then two questions, I think, follow. First, must Dewey’s anti-Kantian rhetoric be tempered by the fact that he draws from Kant more fully than he admits? Second, if Dewey’s neo-Hegelianism is tempered by a concern, already present in 1890, that the ‘absolute’ threatens to swallow up reality, and Kant’s ‘gap’, as philosophically problematic as it is, nevertheless does not swallow up the world and remains part of an antidote to absolutism, then does Dewey turn to Kant in his seeming movement away from neo-Hegelianism? This is a valuable topic in its own right, and deserves further consideration that, sadly, I am unable to attend to here.


60. Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, pp. 191–193 and Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, pp. 198–201. In both of these works, the premises of German Philosophy and Politics are summarized, albeit briefly. Both texts challenge Dewey’s arguments regarding Kant. Neither, however, delves deeply into Dewey’s arguments, nor does either utilize material from Kant to defend the German philosopher. Consequently no systematic exegesis of Dewey, nor a consistent defense of Kant, is put forth. An early essay on German Philosophy and Politics, subsequent to the publication of the work, is Ernest Hocking, “Political Philosophy in Germany,” in John Dewey, The Middle Works 8:473–477. Although correct in its points against Dewey, it nevertheless lacks, as with the others, a systematic critique of Dewey’s arguments.


62. Campbell, J. “Dewey and German Philosophy in Wartime.” There is some overlap between Campbell’s accounting of Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics, and mine. My hope is that readers note whatever differences between the two exist and see these as complementary, not antagonistic.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid. p. II.

65. These charges I have taken up elsewhere. The nub of the response is that if German Idealism bears some responsibility for the Great War, what role has experimental inquiry and empirical analysis of the sort pragmatists recommend played? See for example, Ebbinghaus, “Interpretation and Misinterpretation of the Categorical Imperative.” I do not pause to defend Kant here.


67. Randolph Bourne, “American Use for German Ideals,” p 50–51. Bourne says, “I do not want to say that we did wrong in repudiating the German ideals. I only want to know what our repudiation means. It seemed intuitive rather than deliberate . . . It seemed to mean that we sensed in the German ideals tastes and endeavors profoundly alien to our own. And although it becomes more and more evident that, whatever the outcome of the war, all the opposing countries will be forced to adopt German organization, German collectivism . . . we have taken the occasion rather to repudiate that modest collectivism which was raising its head here in the shape of the progressive movement in national politics.”


70. Ibid, p. 182.

71. Ibid, p. 141.

72. Ibid, p. 143.

73. Ibid.
74. Ibid, p. 145.
75. Ibid, p. 147.
76. Ibid, p. 151.
77. Ibid, p. 182.
78. Ibid, p. 151.
81. Ibid, p. 159.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid, p. 163.
85. Ibid, p. 164.
86. Ibid, p. 171.
88. Ibid, p. 165.
89. Ibid, p. 172.
90. Ibid, p. 175.
91. Ibid, p. 175.
93. Ibid, p. 197.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid, p. 197.
97. Alan Ryan has examined this aspect of Dewey’s text and rejected Dewey’s argument that one could go from Bernhardi’s use of Kant to Kant himself saying that war is rationalized. No doubt, Kant did make some troubling statements in regards to war.