MEMORIAL PRESENTS THE MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF A FLEET SEPARATION POLICY

Background

1. Fleet Separation Policy adopted in 1979 for <65' fleet.

Objective: To separate harvesting from processing and disallow the issuance of new fishing licences to corporations and processing companies.

Amended recently to allow 100% harvester owned corporation to hold license.

2. PIIFCAF - Preservation of the Independence of the Inshore fleet in Canada's Atlantic Fisheries. 2014 deadline to get out of controlling agreements.

What's so Modern about DFO "Modernization?"

- 3. DFO policy review "everything is on the table". Do they stand for nothing? No framework of principles. Sustainability and prosperity. Who's against those? (DFO apparently, based on 3K crab measures) They asked what policies people want to get rid of, not what policies or principles they want to maintain and strengthen.
- 4. Policy review not a single mention of coastal communities. It is the owner-operator fishery that maintains the link between the resource and the coastal communities.

Community Context

- 5. This is part and parcel of a bigger question in whose interest do we harvest a renewable natural resource?
- 6. Fishery is the mainstay of most of our coastal communities. The fishery provides the interesting context for tourism. There's limited attraction to ghost towns.
- 7. The history of the fishery fish was allocated to harvesters. All they were given was the right to fish. Small boats, fish landed locally, licenses can be transferred within NL region only, economic activity generated. Access based on adjacency and historic dependence.

The Corporate Sector

- 8. >65' sector no owner/operator or fleet separation policy, licenses are Atlantic-wide, can be transferred from province to province.
- 9. OCI issue example of consequences of privatization. Too much debt, demands to export unprocessed, landing product outside NL.
- 10. Ask car dealers, furniture dealers, skidoo dealers etc which fishery is most important to the local economy.

We Don't Want to Wind up Like B.C.

11.British Columbia fishery - no O/O, F/S policies. Leasing as % of LV - halibut and sablefish 75%, rockfish 50%, lingcod 38%. Drastic decline of coastal communities, quota leases a huge burden. E.g. of dentist. No \$ left for proper capitalization of vessels or payment of crew.

We Don't Want to Wind up Like B.C.

	7					
	5	SEA WORLD FISHERI FISH LANDING REC				LANDING OFFLOAD AERO INV. PAYHOLL TRUCKING SUMMARY VALIDATION
BOAT:	SEA HARVEST					STATEMENT SENT MONITOR & DATA PROCESS
C.F.V. # :	25734		-	DATE: <	03/16/2010	UNLOADING DOCK: AERO TRADING
TRIP#	F-SEAH-10-01H		AREA :	5E	NO. OF TOTES: 23T HLB, 3T B COD, 11T RF	
SLIP# :	ETA SWF: N/A				3/06-3/16/2010	
				GEAR :	LONGLINE	TRUCKING: N/A (ALL FISH GO TO AERO)
ITEM	The same and the s	QUANTITY		PRICE/ LB	AMOUNT	REMARKS
	YE (#1:2174 #2:10) K (#1:177 #2:3)		LBS			
CHINA / TIG		LBS				
CANARY			LBS			
SILVER GRE	EY		LBS			TOTAL ROCKFISH, LC & BC GROSS INCOME \$14 B11 B1
SHORT RAKER 1,583			LBS	0.75	1.187.25	
ROUGHEYE #1:3207, #2:30 3,237		LBS	0.7/0.5	2,259.90	40,615.50	
IDIOT		398	LBS	1.10	437.80	19.17
		LBS	0.75	51.00		
MIXED ROCI	КҮМ		LBS			
OTHER-	4		LBS			
LING COD	INF		LBS		-	
LING COD -			LBS			
BLACK COD		521	LBS	5.25	2 725 25	TOTAL B COD (J/C): 1,834 = RD: 2,769
BLACK COD	(J CUT) +5	1,313	LBS	6.20		TOTAL B COD (JrC): 1,834 = RD: 2,769 TTL BC RELEASED(JrC): 143 = RD: 216
BLACK COD			LBS	0.00	0,140.00	TTL Q USED (JC)= 1,977 = RD: 2,985
HAIBUT - H		6,824	LBS	4.50	30,708.00	
HAIBUT H/		8,509	LBŞ	4.75	40,417.75	TOTAL HALIBUT NET INCOME(LESS Q FEE): \$24,948.67
HAIBUT H/G (40/60)		1,660	LBS	5.00	8,300.00	
HAIBUT H/G (60/80) HAIBUT H/G (+80)		456	LBS	5.20	2,371.20	
		91	LBS	5.20	473.20	21,010
HAIBUT HA	G (#Z)	3,775	LBS	4.20	15,855.00	
OWNERS OF TAXABLE PARTY.	UDING OVERAGE:		LBS		-	RECEIVER GENERAL FOR CANADA
RIP	FUEL PETRO CANADAMA	28,435	-	GROSS \$	112,936.95	- THOSE OF STOOME
EXPENSES:	GROCERY	1.148.21		HARE / BOAT USE	44 208 00)	
# VALIDATION: \$0.10X HLB WT			100000000000000000000000000000000000000		0.00	SWF: (3.25+0.20)X9306 LBS+(3.25+0.17)X12,008 LBS (TTL HLB Q USED=21,314 LBS) NO ADDITIONAL Q FEE -AVE PR. \$4.60 LESS THAN PRICE BREAK OF \$5.45 OR \$5.42
ODIN BAIT: AERO'S HLB Q FEE				0.00	THE THE STATE OF SECOND PROPERTY OF SEASON S	
AERO INV. BAIT: #70547 5,028.60 SWF'S B COD O FE				(8,896.50)	SWF TO PAY AERO B COD FEE: (\$4.50 X 1,977 J/C WT)	
BAIT: AERO'S B COO		B B COD FEE				
	S GEAR #8870	423.15	ROCKE	ISH O FEE		
PAC. N & 1	PAC. N&T GEAR #48799.#48808 (1/3) 1,978.77 TOTAL TRIS			(14. 54.73)	PAUL: \$1500; SWF:\$14,202.72 TO PAY FOR TRIP EXP. ON PAUL'S BEHALF	
	GEAR EXPENSES	1,500.00	HLB LK	C & RF RENEWAL		SWF: 2010 HLB L113 LEASE FEE \$3,000& ZN047 RENEWAL FEE \$100
	TOTAL EXPENSES :	15.784.72		NET \$	7,736.25	
	\$0 1/LB HLB ONLY FOR	THIS TRIP. BACK TO	0.15/LB	HLB FOR OTH		
S.I.N.	LANDON EDWARDS				SHARE (1/6)	1,289,38
ADDRESS					E.I. (1.73%)	(22.31)
HUUNESS	223 IRWIN ST., NANAIN C: 250-616-3726	NO, BC, V9R 4X4			OTHER	
			-		NET \$	DEPOSIT TO OWN A/C 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
CREW					SHARE (1.25/6)	TO 0 5750 1,611.72
S.I.N.					E.I. (1,73%)	(27.88
	APT. #201, 1908 BOWEN RD., NANAIMO, BC, V9S 5S6 TEL: C: 250-756-5970				NET \$	DEPOSIT TO OWN AIC
					Inti 2	DEPOSIT TO OWN A/C 1,583.84
CREW	NICOLE BOYLE				SHARE (1/6)	1,289.38
S.I.N.				E.I. (1.73%)	(10b U & V) (22.31)	
ADDRESS	156 CRESTVIEW DR., P.R., BC, V8J 2Z5				OTHER	COURIER CHARGES (9.00)
	TEL: 250-627-7996				-	AIR DHL CHECK TO OWN ADDRESS 1,258.07
-	KRIS GOMEZ				SHARE (0.75/6)	1 1 0 1 967.03
CREW	S.I.N.				E.I. (1.73%)	(16.73
S.I.N.		TORIA DC VEW 378			OTHER	COURIER CHARGES (9.00
	#506 - 860 VIEW ST., VI	310110, 00, 1011 32,0				
S.I.N. ADDRESS	#506 - 860 VIEW ST., VII TEL: 250-887-3789	270100,00,1011320			NET \$	MAIL CHECK TO OWN ADDRESS BY EXPRESS POST 941.30
S.I.N.	#506 860 VIEW ST., VII TEL: 250-887-3789	710111111111111111111111111111111111111			NET \$	

The New Zealand Scandal

- 12. New Zealand radical deregulation in 1986, corporate ITQs. Small boat enterprises marginalized. Coastal communities disconnected from fishery, Corporations quickly controlled quotas, set the lease fees, harvesters had all the costs and responsibilities of fishing with little hope of reasonable returns.
- 13. 62% of their offshore catch is on FCVs. NZ Seafood Industry Council tells Ministerial Inquiry they want more cheap labour on their boats, not less. Inquiry set up because of concern about damage to NZ reputation caused by allegations of slave labour aboard FCVs.

What Kind of Model is That?

- 14. CEO of NZ deepsea company: "If a company's only rationale to make money is to pay slave rates of 50 cents an hour they should leave the fish swimming."
- 15. Company deepsea operations manager: "They are true accounts of modern-day people trafficking, slavery, fraud, lies and deception."

16. Fish caught on foreign vessels, processed in China and exported to overseas markets. Where's the NZ benefit in that?

Inevitable

- 17. Inevitable result of radical deregulation of the fishery. Fishing equivalent of sub-prime loans. What kind of model is that to aspire to? What reason is there to think that a radically deregulated Canadian fishery would wind up any differently than NZ?
- 18. There's nothing modern about any of that.

Some Closing Thoughts

- 19. Financial might should not replace adjacency and historic attachment as the cornerstone of resource access.
- 20. Phony argument about ITQs being more conservation oriented. Compare groundfish to lobster.
- 21. ITQ argument is all about ideology. Radical deregulation, like the banking sector. What could possibly go wrong?
- 22. The survival of coastal communities is directly linked to the survival of the Owner-Operator and Fleet Separation policy. Policy change by all means, but the pillars need to remain in place.